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I. CHAPTER 11 UNDER ATTACK
A. Introduction
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978,' the wisdom of a
bankruptcy reorganization chapter was taken as a given. The crux of the
traditional view was summed up in the House Report: "It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and
assets."2 All that was on the table for serious debate was the particulars.
Today, barely a decade and a half later, the climate of opinion has
shifted so dramatically that intelligent people take seriously the suggestion
"that Chapter 11 should be repealed.' This radical proposal was made in
1992 by Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig in a controversial article
in the Yale Law Journal entitled The Untenable Case for Chapter 11.4 And
they are not alone.' Their article capped a growing trend in the "law and

1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and scattered provisions in
U.S.C. tit. 18 and 28).
2. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
3. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1088-89 (1992).
4. Id.
5. Other commentators who have argued for jettisoning Chapter 11, or restructuring
it so much that it would bear little resemblance to its current incarnation, include Barry
E. Adler, Financialand PoliticalTheories ofAmerican CorporateBankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Theories]; Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk
Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439 (1992) [hereinafter Adler, Risk Allocation];
Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics ofBankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523
(1992); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. ECON. 633 (1993)
[hereinafter Baird, Revisiting Auctions]; Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815 (1987)
[hereinafter Baird, Reply]; Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 173 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, World Without Bankruptcy]; Douglas
G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor CorporateReorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127
(1986) [hereinafter Uneasy Case]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REV. 775 (1988); James W. Bowers, The Fantastic
Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-CostSchool of Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91
MICH. L. REv. 1773 (1993) [hereinafter Bowers, ZBC School]; James W. Bowers,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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economics" movement that has questioned the justifications for and
efficiency of Chapter 11,6 since at least 1986. In that year, two prominent
bankruptcy scholars and frequent co-authors, Thomas Jackson and Douglas
Baird, suggested junking Chapter 11 in favor of mandatory sales of the
debtor firm's assets.7
The Bradley and Rosenzweig article accomplished its goal, if that goal
was to provoke controversy. A veritable firestorm of criticism has been
leveled at virtually every aspect of their article. The most visible critics of
Bradley and Rosenzweig and the staunchest defenders of the traditionalist
faith in Chapter 11 have been Elizabeth Warren and Lynn LoPucki.9 They
Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary
Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27 (1991) [hereinafter Bowers, Loss
Distribution];James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097
(1990) [hereinafter Bowers, Groping and Coping]; THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw, ch. 9, Reconsidering Reorganizations, 209-24

(1986); Hon. Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penaltyfor CreditorInterests, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1088 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: a Menu
Approach to CorporateBankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Rasmussen,
Debtor'sChoice]; Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter11, 8 BANKR. DEv.
J. 319 (1991) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Efficiency]; Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt:
A New Model for CorporateReorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983).
6. The generally applicable provisions of "Chapter 11," the single reorganization

chapter of the Code, are found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1988).
7. See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 5; JACKSON, supra note 5, at 209-24.
Jackson could be viewed as the founding father of the economic school as applied to
bankruptcy theory, with his seminal 1982 article, Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, NonBankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
8. Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Casefor the Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE
L.J. 437 (1992) [hereinafter Warren, Untenable Case]; see also Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336 (1993)
[hereinafter Warren, BankruptcyPolicymaking];Elizabeth Warren, "Why Have a Federal
Bankruptcy System?", 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1093 (1992) [hereinafter Warren, Why
Have?]; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987)
[hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy].
9. Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79 (1992) [hereinafter LoPucki, Strange
Visions].
Professor LoPucki co-authored a series of articles with Professor William Whitford,
discussing and analyzing their findings in a massive study of the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held companies. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 597 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns]; Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993) [hereinafter
LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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too have their spiritual allies.'" But even in this camp, clouds can be seen
on the horizon. LoPucki, who has assailed Bradley and Rosenzweig," has
himself written an article called The Trouble with Chapter 11.12
Criticism of Chapter 11 has not been limited to the groves of academe.
Judge Edith Jones, a well-known federal judge who by popular accounts was
the runner-up to Justice David Souter for a seat on the Supreme Court, has3
called Chapter 11 "A death penalty for debtor and creditor interests."1
Leonard Rosen, a prominent corporate reorganization lawyer from New
York City and president of the National Bankruptcy Conference, has stated
in print that "chapter 11 needs a rewrite."' 4 A widely published weekly
bankruptcy newsletter has asked "What's wrong with chapter 11?" 5 Many
Whitford, Venue Choice andForum Shopping in the BankruptcyReorganizationofLarge,
Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 11 [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford,
Venue Choice]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share in the Bankruptcy ReorganizationofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 125 (1990) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Equity's Share].
The same two authors also wrote an interesting piece advocating a reform of the
cram-down procedures. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram
Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 (1991) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive

Cram Down].
10. See Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy-Reorganization
Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1; Jagdeep S. Bhandari & LawrenceA. Weiss, The
Untenable Casefor Chapter11: A Review of the Evidence, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131
(1993); Hon. Lisa H. Fenning, The Future of Chapter 11: One View From the Bench,
1993-1994 ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L. 113; Donald R. Korobkin, The UnwarrantedCase
Against CorporateReorganization:A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IoWA L.
REv. 669 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin, Unwarranted Case]; Donald R. Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values: a Jurisprudenceof Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717 (1991)
[hereinafter Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values]; Marvin J. Whitman et al., A Rejoinder to
"The Untenable Casefor Chapter11," 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 839 (1993). Professor
David Skeel has reviewed the many current theories and found each wanting in some
manner or another, including the Bradley and Rosenzweig hypothesis. David A. Skeel,
Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L.

REv. 465. Mark MacDonald and others have published a provocative piece describing
Chapter 11 as a "living entity." Mark E. MacDonald et al., Chapter11 as a Dynamic
Evolutionary LearningProcess in a Market With Fuzzy Values, 1993-1994 ANN. SURV.
BANKR. L. 1 (1993). A somewhat surprising supporter of Chapter 11 is Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who definitely belongs in the law and economics camp, but who argues that
Chapter 11 must be efficient or it would not exist. Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is
CorporateBankruptcy Efficient? 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990).
11. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 9.
12. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729.
13. See Jones, supra note 5.
14. Leonard M. Rosen, Book, Chapterand Worse: Chapter11 Needs a Rewrite, BUS.
L. TODAY, July-Aug. 1992, at 47.
15. The Debate Continues: What's Wrong with Chapter 11?, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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chroniclers in the popular press have raised questions about the bankruptcy
system and Chapter 11.16 Several books have been published levelling
broadsides at the Chapter 11 process generally and at particular cases
perceived as abusive.17
B. The Origins and Substance of the Criticism
Why is everybody picking on Chapter 11 all of a sudden? The flood of
criticism of Chapter 11 is a result of a confluence of factors. Esoteric
academic suggestions that received little public attention in 198618 made
front page news in 1992.19
A major catalyst behind the outcry undoubtedly has been a series of
highly publicized and criticized Chapter 11 cases. Whether right or wrong,
the perception of many has been that these companies attempted to use

(CRR) at Al (Nov. 5, 1992) [hereinafter What's Wrong?].
16. Bankruptcy Needs Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1993, at A14 [hereinafter
Reform]; Chapter 11: A Costly Solution, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, Nov. 1983, at 25
[hereinafter Costly Solution]; Tom Furlong, A Bankrupt System: The Southland's
Troubled Bankruptcy Courts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at Al; John Greenwald, The
Bankruptcy Game, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 60; Doug Henwood, Failuresin the System:
Behind the Bankruptcy Boom, NATION, Oct. 5, 1992; Kenneth Jost, Chapter 11 Under
Fire, A.B.A.J., July 1992, at 32; Wade Lambert & Milo Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers
Dispute Call for Scrapping Chapter 11 Process, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1992, at B6;
Andrea Orr, "Chapter22" Filings on the Rise, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 1991, at A7; Peter
Passell, Critics of Bankruptcy Law See Inefficiency and Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1993, at Al; Michelle Singletary, Critics Urge Bankruptcy Law Reform, WASH. POST,
Nov. 29, 1992, at A25; The Uses and Abuses of Chapter 11, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18,
1989, at 72 [hereinafter Uses and Abuses]; Donald B. Thompson, A Strategy of Choice;
Chapter11: An Offensive Weapon?, INDUS. WK., Aug. 4, 1986, at 16; Pat Wechsler,
Chapter 11 Attacked as too Soft, Critics Say it Allows Management to Feed off
Company's Creditors, S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1992, at B3 [hereinafter Wechsler, Too
Soft]; Pat Wechsler, Chapter11: Money to Burn? Critics Say Bankruptcy Gives License
to BadManagerswho Fritteraway Assets, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 1992, at 72 [hereinafter
Wechsler, Money to Burn?]; Pat Wechsler, Is it Time to Close the Book on Chapter11?,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 29, 1992, at D1 [hereinafter, Wechsler Close the Book];

When Firms Go Bust, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1992, at 63 [hereinafter Go Bust]; Stanley
Ziemba, Bankruptcy Law Unfair: United Chief, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1993, at B1.
17. See, e.g., KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: How CORPORATIONS
AND CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE (1992); LAURENCE H.
KALLEN, CORPORATE WELFARE: THE MEGABANKRUPTCIES OF THE 80s AND 90s (1991);
RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY (1991); SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAwYERS-INSIDE CHAPTER 11: AN
EXPOSE (1989).
18. See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 5; JACKSON, supra note 5.
19. Skeel, supranote 10, at 466-67; see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3.
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Chapter 11 for illicit purposes: Robins, which tried to shed its Dalkon
Shield liability;2" Manville, which did the same for mass asbestos
claims;2" union-busting cases, such as Continental Airlines, Wilson Foods,
and Bildisco;' LTV, which tried to escape pension obligations to retirees;' and Texaco, which used Chapter 11 to try to avoid an enormous
state-court judgment in favor of Pennzoil.2 4 At a minimum, observers
recognized that the bankruptcy court had become "the forum where large,
complex cases often involving social issues are being handled. "'
The final straw was the disastrous Eastern Airlines case.26 First, that
case captured notoriety as another of Frank Lorenzo's anti-union assaults.
Then, even after the creditors had given up on the business, the bankruptcy
judge allowed Eastern to waste several hundred million dollars more, before
the final liquidation occurred. After Eastern, the crusade against Chapter 11
really picked up steam. Critics had ready grist for their mill.
At the same time that these notorious cases captivated the attention of

20. For the most in-depth study and critique of the Robins bankruptcy, see SOBOL,
supra note 17. For another fusillade at Robins, see KALLEN, supra note 17, ch. 12,
Robins Becomes a Prisonerof its Own Device, at 303-47, and ch. 13, A Toxic Torfeasor
Divesfor the Bankruptcy Bunker, at 348-83; see also Passell, supra note 16, at Al; Uses
and Abuses, supra note 16, at 72.
21. See DELANEY, supra note 17, ch. 3, The Manville Corporation:Solving Asbestos
Liability Through Bankruptcy, at 60-81; KALLEN, supra note 17, ch. 9, Manville: The
Giant at Bay, at 225-47, ch. 10, Stalemate, at 248-74, ch. 11, In Silverman We Trust,
at 275-302; Greenwald, supra note 16, at 60; Passell, supra note 16, at Al; Uses and
Abuses, supra note 16, at 72.
22. See DELANEY, supra note 17, ch. 4, ContinentalAirlines: Using Bankruptcy to

Abrogate Union Contracts, at 82-125; KALLEN, supra note 17, ch. 8, Boffo Battle: Big
Business in Bankruptcy Busts Brotherhoods,at 203-24; Greenwald, supranote 16, at 60;
Jost, supranote 16, at 32; Passell, supra note 16, at Al; Wechsler, Too Soft, supra note

16, at B3; Uses and Abuses, supra note 16, at 72.
23. See 138 CONG. REC. S8268 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Graham);

see also KALLEN, supranote 17, at 388-92; Thompson, supra note 16, at 16; Wechsler,
Money to Burn?, supra note 16, at 72.

24. See DELANEY, supra note 17, ch. 5, Texaco: Using Bankruptcy to Frustratea
Business Rival, at 126-59; KALLEN, supra note 17, at 394-405; Uses andAbuses, supra
note 16, at 72.
25. 138 CONG. REc. S8335 (daily ed. June 17, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Sanford).

Senator Sanford went on to add, "We are seeing large judgments, mass tort claims,
pension shortages, labor disputes, and a host of other problems being played out in the
Bankruptcy Court." Id.
26. See KALLEN, supranote 17, at 405-12; Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig,
Time to Scuttle Chapter11, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, § F (Forum), at 13; Rasmussen,
Efficiency, supranote 5, at 319-21; Skeel, supranote 10, at 467; Greenwald, supra note
16, at 60; Passell, supra note 16, at C9; Wechsler, Money to Burn?, supra note 16, at

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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an ever-more distrusting public, the savings and loan crisis exploded, with
an attendant collapse in real estate values. The enormous Southmark case
typified this problem.27 Part and parcel of this whole disaster was the
leveraged buyout craze of the 1980s, which inevitably, it seems, crashed
into the reorganization court.2" Revco and Federated provide examples of
LBOs reworked in reorganization court, with bondholders left out in the
cold. Chapter 11, it seemed, let the responsible parties off the hook.
Michael Miliken and the Drexel Burnham Lambert case effectively
symbolized the problem.2 9 What one congressman called "financial
shenanigans " 3 should not be countenanced.
An ideological war was also developing. The advocates of right-wing
free-market economics attacked Chapter 11 as an inefficient tool for
propping up weak companies in the interest of misguided warm and fuzzy
notions about preserving jobs and communities.3' If a company cannot pay
its debts, let the creditors foreclose, and be done with it. In a nutshell, that
is the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal.32 Furthermore, those critics
asserted that Chapter 11 should not be used to redistribute losses.33 The
solution? Rely on markets.34

On the other side, Chapter 11 has been viewed as too supportive of
greedy heartless capitalists. Mass tort victims-too bad.35 Organized
labor-good riddance.36 When a congressman uses the term "economic

criminals" in connection with a bankruptcy reform bill,3" it is time to wake

27. See KALLEN, supra note 17, at 416-17.
28. See 138 CONG. REC. H11,056 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Brooks);
see also KALLEN, supra note 17, at 433-46; Greenwald, supra note 16, at 61.
29. See KALLEN, supra note 17, at 434-39; Henwood, supra note 16, at 364.
30. 138 CONG. REc. H11,058 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Glickman).
31. See JACKSON, supra note 5,at 210; KALLEN, supranote 17, at 468; Baird, Reply,
supra note 5, at 828-31; Baird, World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 184-86;
Bowers. Loss Distribution, supra note 5, at 69-76; Jones, supra note 5, at 1090-91;
Rasmussen, Efficiency, supranote 5, at 324; see also Henwood, supra note 16, at 362-64
(describing but disagreeing with the free-market theory).
32. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1078-88; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 26, at 13.
33. See Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 5, at 489; Baird, Reply, supra note 5, at
822-28.
34. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supranote 3, at 1085; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 26, at 13.
35. See, e.g., A.H. Robins, discussedsupra note 20 and accompanying text; JohnsManville, discussed supra note 21 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Wilson Foods, Bildisco, discussedsupra note 22.
37. 138 CONG. REc. H11,058 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Dreier):
"Good businessmen and women are losing out to a wave of economic criminals who have
been using the bankruptcy system to delay and defraud their creditors." (emphasis
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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up and realize that people are upset. The supposed winners? Corporate
managers keeping their jobs and obscene salaries despite poor performance,
and hordes of lawyers sucking enormous fees out of the bankruptcy
system.3" Senator Metzenbaum has convened hearings to probe the problem
of excessive professional fees. 39 Chapter 11 has been called "A Feast for
Lawyers. "40
In this charged setting, it became easy to pick on the recently adopted
Bankruptcy Code. Critics point to the large increase in the number of filings
.since the Code went into effect in 1979, 4' suggesting that the reason was
the suddenly more favorable law.42 Where only 7,827 Chapter 11 cases
were filed in SY 1981, the first full year under the Code, filings almost
tripled over the next two years, to 21,206 in SY 1983, and reached 24,209
in SY 1992." As is often true, however, hysteria does not always consider
the facts: this "excessive" number of 24,000 Chapter 11 filings represented
just a fourth of the total business failures in 1992.44 Furthermore, evidence

added).
38. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1076-77; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 26, at 13; Furlong, supra note 16, at Al; Greenwald, supra note 16, at 60,
61; Passell, supra note 16, at Al.
39. Senator Metzenbaum described the situation as a "feeding frenzy" in which
"professionals literally suck the life out of a bankrupt company by charging exorbitant
and in many cases unnecessary fees." 138 CONG. REC. S8340 (daily ed. June 17, 1992)
(remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
40. STEIN, supra note 17.
41. See 138 CONG. REc. H1l,056 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Fish);
137 CONG. REC. S17,047 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Heflin) (pointing
to "nearly a threefold increase in filings in little more than a decade" as "significant
warnings" that warranted "a significant review of the bankruptcy system"); 137 CONG.
REC. S17,056 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (describing
"bankruptcy boom" and calling bankruptcy a "growth industry").
42. However, rigorous econometric studies that go beyond "armchair empiricism"
raise serious doubts as to whether the increased filing rate can be attributed to the change
in the bankruptcy law. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing
Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An HistoricalAnalysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1993).
43. These statistics are published as Bankruptcy Statistical Information by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, for statistical years running from July 1 to
June 30. The 1992 statistic is reprinted in Press Release (Am. Bankr. Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Sept. 3, 1992, T. F-2, at 4.
44. DUN & BRADSTREET CORP., 1991-1992 Bus. FAILURE REC. 2 (1992) indicates

that 96,587 businesses failed in 1992. By comparison, only 7,564 failures occurred in
1979-only about 8% of the 1992 total; viewed otherwise, there was a thirteenfold
increase in failures from 1979 to 1992. Chapter 11 filings, on the other hand, only
tripled during the same period. Thus, it appears that the "Code-made-them-file" theory
is false, and if anything, far fewer businesses, as a percentage of total business failures,
are filing Chapter 11. These data suggest that general economic conditions, not the Code,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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indicates that filings have begun to drop from the 1992 levels.4 5
Studies also have raised questions about the large costs of Chapter 11,
direct and indirect. One oft-cited example is the fact that the combined value
of Texaco and Pennzoil stock rose by $2.3 billion with the announcement
that they had reached a settlement and that Texaco would be leaving Chapter
1 ." The conclusion drawn was that investors must have projected a
deadweight cost of $2.3 billion from Texaco's bankruptcy case. 7 Other
studies have estimated direct costs in Chapter 11 ranging from three to six
percent of the company's assets.4 8
And there is more fuel for the fire of criticism. The 1989 study done
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts estimated that only about
ten percent of all Chapter 11 cases succeed in rehabilitating the debtor
firm. 9 However, the rate of success for large, publicly held firms is much
higher.5 " Another stated concern is that many debtors (Continental, Braniff,
etc.) revisit Chapter 11-the "serial" filing problem;' or, stated otherwise,
there is a disturbingly "high rate of recidivism." 2 One study found that a
little more than half (58%) of confirmed plans in the test district were
successfully consummated.53

have been the culprit behind the filing boom.
45. Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy Filings Continue to Decrease in 1993, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Oct. 1993, at 11.
46. Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market
Efficiency: UnderstandingPennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REv. 295, 299 (1989).
47. Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 5, at 466.
48. See id. at 465 & n.107; Edward I. Altman, A FurtherEmpiricalInvestigation of
the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1077 (1984) (six percent); Lawrence A.
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution:Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J.
FIN. ECON. 285, 289-90 (1990) (three percent).
49. Ed Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, at 13 (Administrative Office for the
U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Division, Oct. 1989) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
Flynn arrived at this conclusion based on the empirical study for cases through 1986,
which showed (1) a confirmation rate of about 17%, and (2) that about one-fourth of
these were liquidating plans, and then (3) factored in the possibility of subsequent
bankruptcies. Id. at 10-13. Flynn found that the success rate had increased. See also
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1075 & n.75; Jones, supra note 5, at 1089;
Rasmussen, Efficiency, supra note 5, at 322.
50. See LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 9, at 600-01; see also Altman,
supra note 10, at 5-6.
51. See Altman, supra note 10, at 6; Jones, supra note 5, at 1091; Orr, supra note
16.
52. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 731 & n. 9 (thirty-two percent rate for large, publicly
held companies); see also LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 9, at 608.
53. Susan Jensen-Conklin,Do Confirmed Chapter11 PlansConsummate? The Results
of a Study and Analysis of the Law, 97 CoM. L.J. 297, 324 (1992).
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Other studies indicate that the average time a debtor spends in Chapter
11 has increased significantly under the Code.5 4 While exact figures vary,
most studies find an average Chapter 11 sojourn (to confirmation) of oneand-a-half to two years. 5 Time increases costs, both directly and indirectly, and results in wealth transfers.5 6
In summary, then, the charges against Chapter 11 basically are as
follows:
* too many debtors use Chapter 11;
* Chapter 11 is being used for illegitimate reasons;
" managers and lawyers are milking Chapter 11;
" too many Chapter 11 cases fail;
" Chapter 11 cases cost too much;
" Chapter 11 cases take too long; and
" unwarranted redistributional effects occur in Chapter 11.
C. Prospectsfor Reform
So what is going to happen? When a notion gains popular currency, as
has the refrain that "Chapter 11 is in trouble," it could lead to some form
of concrete action. Commissions will be appointed, hearings will be held,
studies will be conducted, and, finally, laws may be passed. And articles
like this will be written. Our society believes that we can fix anything
through the provident exercise of governmental power. This general premise
certainly holds true in the field of bankruptcy law. Every forty years since
1898, Congress has thoroughly revised the bankruptcy laws after years of
study, and then immediately undertaken to make that law "better" via
endless amendments. If people are generally upset about the state of the
bankruptcy system-and they are-then Congress may well pass some laws
to "correct" the problems.
Indeed, in 1992 Congress came close to passing a major bankruptcy
reform bill. Senate bill S. 1985, 57 introduced as a bipartisan bill by
Senators Heflin and Grassley,58 passed the Senate unanimously. 59 Along

54. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 739-45 (describing results of various studies); see
also Altman, supra note 10, at 3-4.
55. See Flynn, supranote 49, at 24 (mean time from filing to confirmation: 740 days;
median time: 656 days); see also LoPucki, supra note 12, at 739-45 (summarizing

different studies); What's Wrong?, supra note 15, at A6 (Prof. LoPucki stating that
average time in Chapter 11 for smaller debtors has gone from eight months to eighteen

months under Code).
56. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 732-39.
57. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in [CCH Special 2] Bankr. L.
Rep. (CCH), No. 337, at 1 (July 2, 1992) [hereinafter S. 1985, Passed Version].
58. 137 CoNG. REc. S17,047 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Heflin, for
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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with numerous specific amendments to the Code, that bill would have
created a National Bankruptcy Review Commission to study the Code for
two years.' Although S. 1985 was modified in many respects as it went
through the House 6' and then through conference,62 the provision for a
Review Commission survived in the final conference version of the bill.63
S. 1985 has been resurrected in the 103d Congress as S.

5 4 0 ,'

which

again provides for a Review Commission.65
The ultimate fate of this and other proposed reforms depends of course
on the House, which seems to have less passion for immediate bankruptcy
reform than the Senate, and on the President. Some of the proposals in the
Senate legislation are noteworthy. To give but one example, S. 1985 as
passed by the Senate66 and now S. 54067 provide for a new small business
chapter, Chapter 10, on a pilot district basis. The hope is that small
businesses (defined as having debts of less than $2.5 million)68 can be

himself and Sen. Grassley).
59. 138 CONG. REc. S8331 (daily ed. June 17, 1992).
60. S. 1985, Passed Version, supra note 57, tit. I, §§ 101-110.
61. H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) passed the House on October 3, 1992
and was made a part of S. 1985 at the request of the House. 138 CONG. REC. Hl1,052
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992). Senator Heflin noted that the bill that passed the House was
"considerably different" from the one that passed the Senate. 139 CONG. REc. S2610
(daily ed. Mar. 10, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
62. As Senator Heflin explained in introducing S. 540 in 1993, S. 1985 as modified
by an informal conference was approved by the Senate but was not passed on by the
House because of "dilatory tactics ... regarding all legislation." 139 CONG. REc. S2611
(Mar. 10, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
63. The final version of the bill is S. 1985, version 6 (Oct. 23, 1992) [hereinafter S.
1985, Final Version]. In this final version, the provision for the Bankruptcy Review
Commission had been moved from title I to title V, §§ 501-510.
64. S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in [CCH Special 1] Bankr. L.
Rep. (CCH) No. 356, at 1 (Mar. 26, 1993) [hereinafter S. 540, Introduced Version].
Senator Heflin, in introducing S. 540, emphasized that it is "very similar" to the version
of S. 1985 that passed the Senate in 1992. 139 CONG. REC. S2610 (daily ed. Mar. 10,
1993) (remarks of Sen.. Heflin). The Senate Judiciary Committee reported out an
amendment in the nature of a substitute. SEN. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS
BANKRUPTCY REFORM LEGISLATION, S. REP. No. 168, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1993).
The text of S. 540 as reported is found at id. 1-38 [hereinafter S. 540, Reported
Version].
65. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, tit. IV, §§ 401-410.
66. S. 1985, Passed Version, supra note 57, § 205.
67. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201.
68. Id. § 201(a) (defining "small business" as "a person engaged in commercial or
business activities (but does not include a person whose primary activity is the business
of owning or operating real property and activities incidental thereto) whose aggregate
liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the petition do not exceed
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reorganized more quickly and cheaply if relieved from complying with the
rigorous procedures of Chapter 11. 69 However, in 1992 Chapter 10 did not
survive to the final conference version;70 whether it will make it through
in the 103d Congress is hard to predict.
At this juncture, with the winds of reform in the air, those interested
in the bankruptcy system-lawyers, judges, professors-need to participate
in the debate about the future of Chapter 11. That is the focus of this article.
II. FIRST PRINCIPLES: WHY CHAPTER 11?
In assessing "the future of Chapter 11," it is important initially to focus
on first principles. We need a reference point. If people say Chapter 11 is
not working, there must be some notion that it is not working in comparison
to some perceived ideal. What is that ideal of Chapter 11? Why do we have
Chapter 11 at all?
It would be an understatement to note that not everyone agrees on what
the fundamental purposes of the corporate reorganization chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code are or should be. Having said that, until fairly recently
there was a relatively strong consensus as to why we have Chapter 11. The
1977 House Report summarizes the essence of that consensus:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue
to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and
produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the
industry for which they were designed are more valuable than
those same assets sold for scrap.71

Professors LoPucki and Whitford have observed that "[t]he existence
of bankruptcy reorganization procedures is commonly premised on the
existence of a difference between the going concern value of the firm and
its liquidation value."I' Professor Warren has summarized the so-called
"traditionalist" theory of corporate reorganization, finding that four primary
goals dominate: "(1) to enhance the value of the failing debtor; (2) to
distribute value according to multiple normative principles; (3) to internalize

$2,500,000").
69. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 39, 43.
70. S. 1985, Final Version, supra note 63.
71. See H.R. RP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 220, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6179.
72. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance,supra note 9, at 758.
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the costs of the business failure to the parties73dealing with the debtor; and
(4) to create reliance on private monitoring.
This idea that the preservation of a business as a going concern is better
for everyone-creditors, stockholders, bondholders, employees, and the
public generally-is not a new one. It has been around for at least a century,
really ever since the Industrial Revolution reached full flower. Reorganizations were first developed in earnest in the late nineteenth century as a way
of keeping the railroads running. The mechanism used was the equity
receivership. 74 Eventually, as more private corporations sought to reorganize, and as the Great Depression hit, the weaknesses in the equity
receivership became increasingly apparent, momentum to enact a statutory
corporate reorganization law became overwhelming, and the laws were
passed.75
Looking at some of the comments made back in the 1930s, at the time
section 77B and then Chapters X and XI were enacted, is instructive for us
today. Those voices from the past serve as useful rejoinders to some of the
more radical suggestions now being made that Chapter 11 should be
sacrificed on the altar of perfect markets. 76 If we forget the past, are we
doomed to repeat it? To give one example, John Gerdes, a noted corporate
reorganization lawyer and lecturer on corporate reorganizations at NYU,
observed in 1936:
The solvency or insolvency of a "big" corporation, having
thousands of stockholders, owning and operating property
throughout the world, and employing a veritable army of workers,
is a matter of importance to the entire nation. The well-being of
such a corporation makes its mark upon the prosperity of the

73. Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 8, at 344. In an earlier article,
Professor Warren observed, "I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with a debtor's
multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of different actors."
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 8, at 777. Later in that article, in an oft-quoted
statement, she concluded, "I have offered a dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view
of bankruptcy from which I can neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily fully
articulate all the factors relevant to a policy decision." Id. at 811. More recently,
responding to Bradley and Rosenzweig, she noted, "The Code is thus designed not only
to enhance the value of the failing business, but also to distribute that value among
interested parties in specified ways." Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 8, at 468.
74. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, at 238-39 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT].

75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 5, at 489; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 3, at 1078.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:791

country; the closing of its plants is a major catastrophe in the lives
of hundreds, often thousands, of employees; its continuation in
business is an item of public concern.'
Today, Elizabeth Warren echoes Gerdes: "The bankruptcy system matters.
It mattered to a $10 billion business like Federated, and it mattered to their
80,000 employees who stayed on the job. "7
Gerdes went on to note: "The properties of a corporation have a maximum
value as parts of an aggregate unit continuing as a going concern. ... Only
by keeping the properties together and by continuing the operation of the
business can the maximum value of the corporate property be maintained. "79
Point one, then, is that a business is worth more alive than dead-i.e.,
it is worth more as a going concern than in a forced sale liquidation; and
that all affected parties, defined broadly, benefit if that going concern is
maintained. Along these lines, it is worth remembering that more than just
the private rights of the creditors and debtor may be implicated; the greater
good of the community at large has always been considered, and rightly so,
relevant to the formulation of bankruptcy policy."0
It should be borne in mind that the foregoing conclusion is not a result
of purely academic conjecture. Indeed, the truth is quite the opposite; it is
what parties in fact do. When a business becomes financially distressed, the
first order of business for the company and its creditors and stockholders is
to try to put together a consensual workout.8 ' Studies have shown that
about half of the business reorganizations effectuated today are done out of
court, by voluntary agreement.' Thus, it is only when an out-of-court
workout cannot be achieved that the need for some other means of business

77. 1 JOHN GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS UNDER § 77B OF THE

BANKRUPTCY ACT § 1, at 2-3 (1936).
78. Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 8, at 478.
79. GERDES, supra note 77, § 1, at 3-4.

80. Back in 1919, a commentator remarked that a creditor's "rights are partially
offset by the paramount rights of the community. A private right must always give place
to a general good." F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAw 191 (1919).

Today, along with Professor Warren, Professor Karen Gross is perhaps the leading
advocate of the need to take the "public interest" into account explicitly as a basis of
reorganization policy. She has suggested that § 1129 should require the court to consider
the public interest as a condition of plan confirmation. Why Should We Have a
Bankruptcy Law?, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR), at A10 (Dec. 10, 1992).

81. For a discussion of out-of-court workouts, see Hon. Conrad B. Duberstein, OutINST. L. REV. 347 (1993).
82. Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Restructurings:An Empirical Study of

of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR.

PrivateReorganizationof Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 345 (1990).
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reorganization presents itself. When a company gets into financial difficulties, the first thought is not, "let's auction off the assets"; rather, the first
thought is, "let's make a deal."
Point two concerns the means to achieve the end of maintaining the
business as a going concern when voluntary arrangements cannot be effected
out of court. In thinking about what those means should be, it is helpful to
focus on the reasons why voluntary workouts fail. One of the biggest
problems is dealing with dissenting or recalcitrant creditors.83 Outside of
some form of court-supervised model, creditors are free to pursue their own
individual collection remedies-execution or garnishment by unsecured
creditors, repossession and foreclosure by secured creditors, and so forth.
This piecemeal seizure and sale of corporate assets has the potential to
destroy the debtor's business. As Gerdes again noted, "Any system which
would allow a creditor of a distressed corporation to levy upon and sell
individual portions of its property would most certainly result in a vast
amount of economic waste. "I Professors Baird and Jackson, generally no
fans of Chapter 11, echo that point in modern times.I
If some creditors are able to pursue collection in their own interest, a
holdout problem appears.86 Even if a proposed workout would be better for
the entire group of creditors than a liquidation, each creditor acting selfishly
has an incentive to "hold out" and not sign on to the workout agreement.
The holdout creditor can threaten to pursue individual collection activities
that might irreparably damage the workout unless paid in full.
Two principal remedies are needed to counter the holdout dissenter
problem. One is a stay or injunction against all creditors preventing them
from pursuing their own claims during the pendency of the reorganization
discussions and negotiations. Such a stay preserves the status quo." Under
our current Bankruptcy Code section 36288 serves this function. In equity
receiverships a court-ordered injunction accomplishes the same end.
The second essential ingredient required to counter the holdout problem
is the ability to bind dissenting creditors to the plan agreed to by the
majority of creditors. 89 Such a provision allows the reorganization plan to

83. See id. at 321.
84. GERDES, supra note 77, § 1, at 3.
85. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 10-17; Baird, World Without Bankruptcy, supra note
5, at 183-84.
86. See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 416-17; Gilson et al., supra note 82, at 32122; Robert M. Weinstein, Trends in Large CorporateRestructurings,AM. BANKR. INST.
J., July-Aug. 1992, at 13.
87. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 220, 340, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6180, 6296-97; JACKSON, supra note 5, at 151.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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work once agreed to by the majority. Dissenters are permanently enjoined
from pursuing their own prior claims after the requisite majority of creditors
agree to a deal. The only claim the dissenter is left with is that provided for
in the reorganization agreement itself. Once such a majority-rule provision
is in effect, the incentive to hold out in the first place is largely eliminated,
and meaningful negotiations can be carried out. Under our current law,
section 1141 implements this policy of binding recalcitrant creditors.' ° At
the same time, other provisions in Chapter 11 attempt to provide for fair
treatment of the dissenters' claims. 9'
Any reform proposal that does not contain these two provisions-a stay
of individual collection actions during plan negotiations and a subjugation
of minority wishes to those of majority-is doomed to fail and is unworkable. Again, this is not a matter of conjecture; it is simply a recognition of
the way the world works. Chapter 11 is the product of experience. Equity
receiverships were used because voluntary deals could not be made. Section
77B and then Chapters X and XI, which were designed to replace equity
receiverships, were enacted for the same reason. So too with Chapter 11 in
1978. Even with Chapter 11 in place, people are free to agree to out-ofcourt workouts, and they still do so, in large numbers.'
Inevitably, once a court-supervised system is in place, that colors the
tenor of the negotiations that go on outside of court, prior to the initiation
of court proceedings. Parties who know what their options would be in court
have a baseline from which to negotiate outside of court. Recognition of that
fact is not, however, a reason to decide not to have a court-supervised
system in the first place. It may be a factor to consider when drafting the
shape and contours of that court-supervised system, but nothing more. A

at 6180; Gilson et al., supra note 82, at 321-22.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a); see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 418, reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6180.
91. The "best interests" test, which is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), requires
a confirmed plan to provide that each holder of a claim or interest will receive at least
as much under the plan as they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. The court also must be
persuaded that the plan is feasible. Id. § 1129(a)(1 1).
Classification also provides substantial protections. Only substantially similar claims
or interests may be placed in the same class. Id. § 1122(a). Claims or interests in the

same class then must receive the same treatment. Id. § 1123(a)(4). Unless the class is
unimpaired, id. § 1124, class members are entitled to vote on the plan, id. § 1126(a),
after receiving a disclosure statement that has been approved as containing "adequate
information," id. § 1125(b). If a class does not accept the plan, then the plan proponent

may only obtain confirmation under the cramdown provisions of § 1129(b). Cram down
requires a showing that the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable.
Id. § 1129(b)(1). In addition, at least one impaired class must accept the plan. Id. §

1129(a)(10).
92. See Gilson et al., supra note 82, at 345-46.
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default rule always exists. If Chapter 11 were to be repealed, the default
rule then would be state collection law, 93 which carries with it the holdout
problems already described. Also, state laws of execution, garnishment and
the like are designed to deal only with individual collection problems, not
with a collective default. 4 If one is concedes that maintenance of a going
concern is preferable to piecemeal liquidation, then the need at a minimum
for rules similar to current sections 362 and 1141 seems to follow.
Adopting the two provisions just referred to does not dictate any
answers to the question of the extent to which a business reorganization law
should reallocate or redistribute losses between different groups of creditors
and equity holders. So far all I am stating is that asset value maximization,
through proper deployment of the debtor's property in a going business, is
to be preferred to the diminished returns available in a forced liquidation
sale. At a minimum, collective action in the interests of the group as a
whole should be mandated.
Some of the academic critics of Chapter 11 focus not on the utility of
Chapter 11 as a potential value maximizer, but instead on the secondary
effect of Chapter 11 as a mechanism for shifting losses from one group to
another. This loss-shifting effect is improper, they allege. They then jump
to the conclusion that Chapter 11 should be repealed, because of this
reallocative tendency.95 I fail to see the logical connection between the
criticism and the conclusion. Once we have a system in place that blocks
holdout activity that would be destructive to the group as a whole, losses can
be apportioned in any number of ways. Several of the specific reform
proposals that I will address later speak to modifications of the loss
allocation. I believe that it is fundamental, however, to distinguish between
proposals on the one hand that recognize the basic legitimacy of the general
concept of Chapter 11 as a means for preserving value and then suggest
ways to improve the efficiency of that mechanism in various particulars, and
on the other hand proposals that would jettison Chapter 11 altogether. The
former, I think, are fair game for discussion, on which reasonable people
can disagree; the latter are, to the contrary, naive and unworkable.
III. REPEAL REJECTED

A. Overview
Let us turn briefly to address the arguments that Chapter 11 should be
repealed. Two basic types of suggestions have been made to replace the
court-supervised reorganization procedure we know as Chapter 11. One is

93. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 8, at 781-85, 808-11.
94. Id. at 782-85.
95. See, e.g., Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 5, at 489.
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to let the parties handle it themselves by contract;96 the other is to require
a sale in every case.' Each is premised on three essential views: first, that
the current scheme is inefficient-viz., it takes too long, is too costly, too
many cases fail, etc.; second, that Chapter 11 should not have a redistributional effect-i.e., that creditor and stockholder priorities should be
strictly respected; and third, that market mechanisms would work effectively. At bottom, all of the current radical proposals for repealing Chapter 11
are founded on an unswerving devotion to laissez-faire. Leave the parties
alone, let them work it out, and all will be well.
These various free-market proposals seem to overlook one glaring
point: laissez-faire has already been tried in this setting, and all was not
well; it did not work. Businesses did fail, and workouts could not always be
put together, and yet, affected parties persisted in the notion that they would
be better off if the business could be reorganized. Chapter 11 is not some
experiment in social engineering imposed on an unwilling business
community by foolish simpletons from on high. Chapter 11, or something
like it, is what the business community wanted, and still wants. Furthermore, if Chapter 11 were not necessary, then even though it is on the books
it would become a dead letter.9"
Conversely, even if Chapter 11 were repealed tomorrow, if a need for
the relief afforded by that chapter persisted, replacements or surrogates for
Chapter 11 would arise. 9 Perhaps equity receiverships would return to the
fore. Perhaps creative Chapter 7 proceedings, with liberal interpretations of
section 721"'° and substantial resort to section 105,"'1 would evolve.
Whatever the form, the essence would persist because, as a society, we feel
it must.
B. MandatoryAuctions
Let us nevertheless consider the merits of the suggested replacements

96. See Adler, Theories, supranote 5, at 323-33; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note
3, at 1078-88.
97. See JACKSON, supra note 5,at 218-24; Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 139-

45.
98. See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 416-17 (pointing out that when auctions are
superior, they will be used).
99. See Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 8, at 478.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1988) allows the court to authorize the trustee to operate the
debtor's business for a limited period, if operation is in the best interest of the estate and

would be consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) permits the court to "issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." Expansive uses
of § 105(a) are legendary in the bankruptcy field.
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for Chapter 11. One proposal is that Chapter 11 should be replaced with a
mandatory auction sale under Chapter 7. Baird'02 and Jackson'0° have
been the leading proponents of this view. They reason that the confirmation
of a Chapter 11 plan effects a hypothetical sale of the debtor's assets to its
creditors. But such a hypothetical sale creates prbblems of valuation and of
strategic posturing in light of the valuation difficulty, they assert. Why not
simply require an actual sale instead of a hypothetical sale? This allegedly
would save many of the deadweight costs generated by Chapter 11
negotiations, speed up the proceedings, and provide a market solution to the

valuation problem. There is no reason why the actual sale has to be
piecemeal, at forced sale prices. Sell the whole business, lock, stock, and
barrel as a going concern to the highest bidder. Then take the pot of cash
and deal with the allocation issues."
If this sounds too good to be true, it is. To begin with, a mandatory
sale system was the form used in the old equity receiverships. For many
reasons, that approach fell into disfavor. Going back to a forced-sale regime
would require explaining why the concerns that led to the demise of the
equity receivership either no longer hold true, or could be alleviated by wise
implementation.
Anyway, auctions are now possible in Chapter 11 cases. The 1992
FinancialNews Network0 5 case out of the Second Circuit is testament to
the flexibility currently available in effecting such sales. Proponents of the
mandatory auction proposal bear the burden of establishing why the benefits
of making such a sale required, instead of permissive, outweigh the costs of
doing so. The reasons given largely point to a distrust of non-market
mechanisms;" 6 a concern about Chapter l's redistributive effects;"
and the recognition of a prevailing ethos suggesting a disinclination to make
actual sales.'0 8
Each of these arguments has its own weaknesses. Furthermore,
significant new problems would be created by a mandatory-auction regime.
Many of the same advantages could be realized by significantly less drastic
amendments to the Code. To begin with, the concerns about the efficacy of

102. Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 139-45.
103. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 218-24.
104. Id. at 209-24; Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 136-47.
105. Consumer News & Bus. Channel Partnership v. Financial News Network Inc.
(In re Financial News Network Inc.), 980 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1992). For a discussion of
that case, see Charles J. Tabb, FinancialNews Network Auction Upheld, 13 BANKR. L.
LETTER, Apr. 1993, at 3-5.
106. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 218-21; Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 13637, 142-45.
107. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 223.
108. See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 5, at 145.
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non-market mechanisms and about loss shifting do not really speak to the
issue of whether sales should be mandatory or permissive. The dominant
reason for insisting on mandatory sales must either be a paternalistic imposition on the parties of what is best for them, whether they know it or not, or
a divestiture of control from the debtor's management to prevent them from
blocking a beneficial sale." 9
The latter concern is a serious one. It is not implausible to believe that
debtor management might resist a sale that would put them out of a job.
This control problem, however, can be addressed without repealing Chapter
11 entirely. That is like chopping off your hand to remove a hangnail.
Amending the Code to make it easier to appoint a trustee," or to limit
exclusivity to allow creditors to propose a sale plan,"' or even to mandate
an early inquiry into the feasibility of a sale," 2 all would limit the debtor's
veto power and yet preserve the flexibility of going forward in a traditional
reorganizing Chapter 11.
The detriments of a mandatory-sale system would be immense. To
begin with, it is very doubtful that every Chapter 11 debtor would have a
ready buyer who would value the debtor as highly as the existing creditors
and stockholders-and who could be compelled to actually bid that value in
a bankruptcy auction. If IBM were to file Chapter 11, is there really a
competitive market of IBM buyers out there?"' In some cases there might
be, but a mandatory system would require a buyer in every case. Otherwise,
the debtor would be carved up piecemeal, and the going-concern surplus
would be lost.
Auction theorists have pointed out many difficulties in actually attaining
full value in auction sales. There must be competition among several wellinformed and well-financed bidders, a scenario that is not at all self-evident
in the bankruptcy context." 4 The prospect of minimal competition is
heightened when an entire industry-the airline industry, for example-is
suffering from financial distress. 1 5
In a typical increasing-bid auction, the bidder willing to pay the highest
amount can only be forced to pay $1 over the amount the second highest
bidder would pay, even if the high bidder itself placed a higher value on the
property." 6 The difficulties and costs for potential bidders to obtain full
109. See Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supranote 5, at 8-13.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988); see infra part V.M.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1121; see infra part V.B.
112. See infra part V.L.
113. See Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 8.
114. Id.at 7-8; LoPucki & Whitford, CorporateGovernance,supra note 9, at 763-64;
Skeel, supra note 10, at 477-78.
115. See Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 5, at 17; Skeel, supra note 10, at 477.
116. See Bruce A. Markell, The CaseAgainst Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 AM.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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and accurate information about the debtor in order to make a bid would chill
the bidding. 1 7 This problem is especially acute in the case of many
insolvent firms, where ascertaining the true financial status of the firm can
be difficult, if not impossible."' Furthermore, for all but the winning
bidder, the costs of participating in the auction process will be lost, a fact
which further serves to chill active bidding. 9
Even if there were such potential buyers, the costs of locating them
would be immense. 2 Perhaps the mandatory auction proposal should be
relabelled the "full employment for investment bankers" proposal. While
investment bankers no doubt would appreciate the new business given the
easing of the takeover mania, investment bankers charge a lot for their
services, and those fees would have to be paid out of the estate. Whether
there would be substantial cost savings under an auction regime is far from
clear. 121

Nor is it evident that the process could be substantially speeded up, as
it would take time for bidders to be located and for them to investigate the
debtor. In the meantime, someone would have to run the debtor's business
to preserve the going-concern surplus. The existing debtor management
would have a reduced incentive to do so if they knew they were simply
minding the store for an interim period before they would be thrown out on
the street.
Along the same lines, it is possible that debtors would be more reluctant
to file a bankruptcy petition in the first place if they knew that a sale was
mandated and that they would be losing their jobs." Accordingly,
creditors would have to be given more extensive powers to file involuntary
petitions. Whether such a development would be welcome is questionable.
Creditors would have more leverage against debtors in non-bankruptcy
negotiations. Other creditors also would be more at risk from the negative

of auction theory with bankruptcy
reorganization practice, see Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority
in Bankruptcy Reorganizations,44 STAN. L. REv. 69, 107-11 (1991).
117. See Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 9-10; Skeel, supra note 10, at 478.
118. See Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 5, at 19-20; LoPucki & Whitford,
CorporateGovernance, supra note 9, at 759.
119. See Aghion et al., supra note 5, at 10; Skeel, supra note 10, at 478.
120. See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 415.
121. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 765. Even
Professor Baird, one of the spiritual fathers of the mandatory auction idea, has
recognized that the costs of an auction, akin to making an initial public offering (IPO),
may well exceed the direct costs of a standard Chapter 11 case with its "hypothetical"
sale. Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 5, at 9-10. He attempts to counter this point
by arguing that the indirect costs of a reorganization may be much higher. Id. at 10-12.
122. See Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 5, at 20.
BANKR. L.J. 349, 363 (1992). For further comparison

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:791

effects of strategic action by some creditors in such a system.
A variant of the mandatory auction approach is to use an options
system." The basic idea is that all of the firm's stock would be distributed to senior creditors, and junior claimants then would be given options to
purchase stock from the senior claimants by paying their pro rata share of
that senior creditor's claims. In addition, the process could be opened up to
outside bids for the company, as well as to bids from existing management.
While the options theory addresses some of the concerns about the pure
auction approach, especially by opening up the bidding process, it too
appears to be of questionable practical feasibility. Professor Skeel has
thoughtfully dissected this proposal, as well as many of the others, in an
article in the Wisconsin Law Review. 24 As Skeel points out, the essential
failing of the options approach is that it depends on a perfectly efficient
market, in which claimants can accurately predict the value of the firm,
make informed decisions whether to exercise their option, and then have the
necessary cash to actually exercise the option. Furthermore, before the
options process could begin, the court must sort out the respective
entitlement of the various parties, for it is necessary to know just who the
senior claimants are. Once all of this becomes necessary, much of the
supposed advantage over existing Chapter 11 evaporates."z
C. Contingent Equity and the Preeminence of
Contracts and Markets
The foregoing sale and options proposals at least contemplate some
form of court intervention while the sale or option exercise is being effected.
Thus, individual creditor action would be stayed and dissenters would be
bound. The proposal made by Bradley and Rosenzweig in their Yale Law
Journal article, however, would forego any form of court supervision,
except for strictly enforcing contractual default provisions agreed to by the
parties ex ante. 2 6 Professor Adler has made a somewhat similar proposal
in an article in the Stanford Law Review. 27
The Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal is, in their words, a "contingent
equity" scheme. 2 The reason is this: when a debt payment comes due,

123. See Bebchuk, supranote 5, at 781-88; Roe, supra note 5, at 559; Aghion et al.,
supranote 5, at 23-29. These proposals are critiqued by Skeel, supra note 10, at 479-81.
124. Skeel, supra note 10, at 479-81.
125. See id.
126. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1085 ("An important feature of our
proposal, distinct from others, is that it completely avoids judicial intervention.").
127. Adler, Theories, supra note 5, at 323-33.
128. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1079.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6

22

Tabb: The Future of Chapter 11

19931

FUTURE OF CHAPTER 11

the debtor must either pay it or the most junior residual equity holder
class-e.g., the common stock-loses all claim to the firm's assets. If the
debtor is a viable entity, their theory goes, then the residual claimants
should be able to raise enough money in the capital markets to meet the debt
payment. If not, good riddance. Once common stock holders are eliminated,
the residual interest in the firm passes up the priority ladder to the next most
junior interest. That group then must decide either to pay the senior
creditors or default, thereby losing their interest as well. So goes the process
until the residual interest passes up to a class that pays the senior debt, or
if not, to the senior creditors themselves, who thereupon "own" the
firm.I29 Such a scheme would require parties to negotiate up front not only
for their priority status, which later would be strictly enforced, but also for
a myriad of debt covenants to block the debtor from engaging in destructive
strategic behavior. 3 ' Overall, the beauty of the scheme, as Bradley and
Rosenzweig see it, is that the market controls.' A long and expensive
Chapter 11 is avoided.
Many commentators have assaulted the Bradley and Rosenzweig
proposal, and, I believe, have exposed serious flaws. 3 ' The most telling
criticisms are summed up neatly by Professor LoPucki's characterization of
Bradley and Rosenzweig's world as a "PM-ZTC" world, i.e., "perfect
markets, zero transaction costs."' 33 The fly in the ointment is that (1)
markets do not work perfectly, and (2) transaction costs do exist. As
LoPucki observes, "Bradley and Rosenzweig have. . . demonstrated again
how great are the differences between the world in which we live and the
world in which so many economists do their thinking."' 34
To illustrate, take one of the many critical assumptions Bradley and
Rosenzweig make, namely, that a solvent but perhaps momentarily illiquid
debtor facing an upcoming debt payment could resort to the debt or equity
markets to raise the necessary cash to make the payment. If the debtor
cannot do so, then the all-knowing market must have judged that the debtor
was in fact insolvent.'35 But is that conclusion inexorable, in the real
world? Does "the market" possesses the kind of information and the
flexibility to react immediately and efficiently to an illiquid debtor's plea for
129. Id. at 1079-85.
130. Id. at 1086-88.
131. Id. at 1085.
132. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 10, at 10-18; Bhandari & Weiss, supra note 10,
passim; Korobkin, UnwarrantedCase, supra note 10, passim; LoPucki, Strange Visions,
supranote 9, passim; Skeel, supra note 10, at 483-91; Warren, Untenable Case, supra
note 8, passim; Whitman et al., supra note 10, passim.
133. LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 9, at 99.
134. Id.
135. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1081-82.
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cash? 3 6 Note that if the market is not perfectly efficient in this context,
then the Bradley and Rosenzweig proposal falls apart. Absent perfect
efficiency, classes of equity or debt would be canceled even if they have a
positive value, solely because of a liquidity problem.
Furthermore, Bradley and Rosenzweig assume that the residual class
facing the decision to pay or default could act efficiently to make that
judgment. This would require the group to have perfect information about
the debtor's finances. Even more problematic, however, is the assumption
that the many hundreds or even thousands of individual members of the
affected class could easily coordinate and make a decision.'37 One of the
reasons Chapter 11 exists is to facilitate participation and negotiation by
widely dispersed constituencies. LoPucki notes that "Chapter 11 exists
solely to deal with transaction costs."' 38 Bradley and Rosenzweig just
assume this problem away.
The scheme propounded also depends on a ready ability to define,
ascertain, and enforce defaults. Extensive and costly bargaining up front
would be required to regulate the many problems of possible strategic
behavior by debtor management or by creditors. A fundamental difficulty
exists here. Most contractual negotiations are between the debtor and a
particular creditor. Other creditors are not party to those contracts; they
negotiate their own deals. Yet, the problems that require resort to Chapter
11 stem largely from a need for collective action involving all creditors and
equity holders. Trying to involve all parties in up-front bargaining would be
every bit as difficult as bargaining in Chapter 11.
Furthermore, the emphasis on enforcing the contract highlights another
critical failing of the Bradley and Rosenzweig approach. What about
nonconsensual creditors?' 39 Many of the most difficult Chapter 11 cases
involve tort creditors, or environmental obligations, or tax claims. A pure
contract-market regime does nothing in these cases.
Nor would it be a simple matter to ascertain the existence of a
default. 40 Assuming along with Bradley and Rosenzweig that detailed and
complex debt covenants would have to be agreed to in order to prevent
various forms of strategic behavior, one might further expect that determining whether the terms of a such a complicated default provision were
contravened might be difficult. Indeed, extensive litigation over the matter

136. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 9, at 100-02; Skeel, supra note 10, at
483-84; Whitman et al., supranote 10, at 850-51.
137. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 9, at 101-03.
138. Id. at 106.
139. See Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 8, at 472-73.
140. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 9, at 103-04.
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could be expected' 41-especially in light of the draconian ramifications of
a default. One also might question the willingness of courts to give effect to
the harsh scheme suggested. Would a court actually permit the vaporization
of an entire equity class because of a technical default?
Another puzzle about the Bradley and Rosenzweig scheme that presents
itself to real-world participants in the bankruptcy system is this: what
happens during the process of canceling classes and moving up the priority
ladder? Who runs the company, and who decides who runs the company? 42 Each time a residual class is canceled, does the next class up the
ladder have the right to elect a new set of corporate directors? A company
must keep operating its business if going-concern values are to be preserved.
The feasibility of doing this while classes are being wiped out is unlikely.
Further, absent a stay or injunction against collection action, once a default
has occurred nothing would prevent creditors from enforcing their claims
against the debtor company, thereby effectively mooting the "pay or
143
default" decision.
Other criticisms could be leveled against the contingent-equity scheme.
In summary, however, such a system is completely unworkable in the real
world, where markets are not perfect, and where transaction costs do exist.
If a voluntary workout cannot be achieved, then it appears that some form
of court-supervised reorganization-be it Chapter 11, or Chapter 10, or a
receivership, or whatever-will be necessary to allow the efficient preservation of a going-concern surplus for all interested parties. Let us now turn to
a detailed consideration of various suggestions for improving the operation
of the current reorganization scheme.
IV. Two CHAPTERS OR ONE-IS CHAPTER 10 A DESIRABLE ADDITION?
One of the most hotly debated proposals is to add a new small-business
chapter to the Bankruptcy Code. Both S. 1985, passed in 1992 by the
Senate, 1" and S. 540,145 the currently pending bill, provide for such a
chapter on a pilot district basis. The experiment is called Chapter 10.
Adoption of Chapter 10 would signal a return to the two-chapter business
reorganization system used under the Act (but of course, in the interest of
confusion, with the numbers of the large- and small-business chapters
reversed). In weighing the wisdom of this idea, it might be useful to harken

141. See Whitman et al., supra note 10, at 855-56.
142. See Lopucki, Strange Visions, supra note 9, at 104-05; Skeel, supra note 10, at

486.
143. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 47.
144. S. 1985, Passed Version, supra note 57, § 205.
145. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201.
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back to the reasons why the reformers of the 1970s decided to junk the twochapter approach, and ask whether those reasons still obtain.
One of the primary criticisms in the 1970s of the multiple-chapter
approach to reorganizations was the difficulty of sorting out which debtors
should be allowed to proceed under which chapter. 146 The Act did not use
a per se rule to distinguish between proper debtors; instead, the propriety
of relief depended on the "needs to be served" by the filing.' 47 One
ramification of this uncertainty was extensive litigation over the chapter
choice.' 48 A second and related problem was that over time, the use of one
chapter, Chapter XI, came to predominate. 49 Most debtors preferred
Chapter XI because they wanted to retain control over the case, with
permanent exclusivity in plan filing and freedom from the restrictions of
Chapter X, such as the mandatory appointment of a trustee and the powerful
supervisory role of the SEC. 50
One way to solve this sorting problem is to impose an arbitrary cutoff.
Examples of yardsticks that could be used include the amount of debt, or
total assets, or the number of public security holders, and the like. This tack
would have the major benefit of reducing litigation over chapter selection.
The version of Chapter 10 favored by the Senate takes this bright-line approach. It defines a "small business" as one with $2.5 million or less in
liquidated debts. 151 An earlier version of the 1992 bill would have opted
for an open-ended, multi-factor test gauged ultimately by whether the "best
interests" of the estate would be served by proceeding in Chapter 10.152

146. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 221-24, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6181-83; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 245-48.
147. General Stores Corp. v. Schlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 223, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6182; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 247.
149. See 124 CONG. REc. H11,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC.
S17,418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 222, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6182 (less than 10% of business reorganization cases under

Chapter X); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 246-47.
150. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supranote 2, at 222, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 247.
151. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201(a).
152. S. 1985, § 205(a)(2), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprintedin 137 CONG. REC.
S17,049 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) [hereinafter S. 1985, Introduced Version]:

at 6182; COMMISSION

"small business" means a person engaged in commercial and business

activities where, if appropriate, after court determination, it is found that the

best interests of an estate will be served by having such person deemed to be
a small business, in light of(A) the number of employees of the person's business activity;
(B) the number of creditors of the person's business activity;
(C) the number of secured, priority, and unsecured creditors of the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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Professor Skeel has suggested a different eligibility standard, focusing on
whether the debtor is a close corporation or not.'53
As is true with all arbitrary cutoffs, a bright-line approach to the
eligibility issue has the problem of being arbitrary. It would be both
underinclusive and overinclusive. Devising an easily applied objective
standard that would put only the "right" debtors into one chapter would be
well-nigh impossible. The reformers of the 1970s found this to be an
insuperable problem.' Is the situation any different now? The answer is
probably not. It is likely that some debtors with only $2.4 million in debt
might have complicated problems suggesting that Chapter 11 is a preferable
forum, while a simple, closely held business with $2.6 million in debts
might be the paradigmatic Chapter 10 candidate. Ultimately the question is
whether we can live with this rough justice, comparing the burdens and
benefits. Perhaps we can; exactness in chapter choice may not be that
important a value. I would agree with the Senate reformers that if a separate
small-business chapter is deemed worth the trouble, then it is essential to
have a bright-line eligibility rule. Otherwise, litigation over eligibility will
overwhelm any advantages that otherwise might accrue.
The impetus behind the Chapter 10 movement comes mostly from a
desire to reduce the length and cost of reorganization cases involving small
businesses.'5 5 The procedures and mechanisms spelled out in Chapter 11
are thought to be unnecessary overkill in many smaller cases. Examples
include the requirement that a creditors' committee be appointed in every

person's business activity;
(D) the value of the assets of the person's business activity;
(E)the dollar volume of sales of the person's business activity;

(F) the nature and substance of the person's business activity;
(G) the history of the person's business activity;

(H)the nature and substance of the person's business activity as measured
by similar persons engaged in the same business activity; and
(1) other pertinent factors.
Senator Grassley described this as a "totality of the circumstances" test. 137 CONG. REC.
S17,057 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
153. Skeel, supra note 10, at 510-17.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 223, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6182 ("In sum, any justification that existed in 1938 for two reorganization chapters
has disappeared."); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 248 ("[lt is not
feasible to carve out of Chapter XI certain cases which should be under Chapter X....

Suggestions for an arbitrary cutoff are without merit. The only solution is an elimination
of the disparate procedures.").
155. S.REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 39, 43; see also Hon. John C. Akard,
Chapter 13 for Small Business?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1992, at 17; Thomas E.
Ray, Chapter13-A Little Surgery Could Go a Long Way, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar.
1993, at 31.
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case, 5 6 that the court approve a disclosure statement that will be mailed
to everyone, 157 and that presumptively all creditors and equity holders
must vote on the plan."'
What sorts of changes would Chapter 10 make in the interests of
expedition and economy? Section 1021 would compel the debtor to file a
plan within ninety days after the order for relief." 9 Extensions could be
granted only if "substantially justified,"" 6 a standard apparently intended
to be more demanding than the current "cause" standard in section
1121.1 6 The debtor retains throughout the exclusive right to file a plan.
Confirmation under section 1026 would not require a vote of creditors. 62
This in turn would obviate the need for a general disclosure statement. 63
The hearing on confirmation must be concluded not later than forty-five
days after the plan is filed, with an exception for cause. 6
No provision is made for the appointment of committees; given the
absence of a creditor vote and unlimited debtor exclusivity, the need for
negotiations largely disappears. The monitoring function of Chapter 11
committees would be performed by a standing trustee analogous to a
Chapter 13 trustee. 65 Placing the monitoring in the hands of a standing
trustee supposedly
would counter the widespread problem of creditor apathy
66
in small cases.'
Another significant change from Chapter 11 practice that Chapter 10
would countenance is the abrogation of the absolute priority rule. Under

156. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
157. Id. § 1125(b).
158. Id. § 1126(a).
159. S.540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201(c) (to be codified at I1U.S.C.

§ 1021).
160. Id.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d).
162. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1026). The accompanying report states that the provisions of Chapter 10 "do not
provide creditors with ultimate veto authority to prohibit the plan from being confirmed."
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 45.
163. Somewhat mystifyingly, however, proposed § 1023 would require a disclosure
statement to be sent before soliciting acceptances or rejections of the plan. S. 540,
Reported Version, supra note 801, § 201(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1023). As
noted in the text, however, voting is eliminated from the Chapter 10 process. Anyway,
all that § 1023 would require is a disclosure statement that "includes information
sufficient to show whether or not the plan meets the requirements of section 1026." Id.
Furthermore, that section would allow for a standard form disclosure statement as
approved by the court. Id.
164. Id. § 201(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1025(d)).
165. S.REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 43.
166. Id.
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section 1026 the equity holders could retain an interest and confirm a plan
over the objection of creditors if (1) the best interests test is met, 67 and
(2) the debtor commits all disposable income over a three-year period to
plan payments.' Allowing current owners to stay in place is consistent
with the prevailing notion that in small companies, unlike large public

companies, much of the value of the business is inextricably tied up in the
personalities of specific individual managers.
Many of these changes seem to make substantial sense for small
business debtors. But, perhaps the essential benefits of these modifications
can be realized within the confines of existing Chapter 11, without the
necessity for creation of a separate chapter. In other words, would it not be
better if Chapter 11 could be drafted so as to be flexible enough to
accommodate large corporations as well as Mom-and-Pop grocery stores?
Those responsible for creating Chapter 11 in the 1978 Code thought the
answer was "yes";69 after a decade170and a half of experience, the answer
appears to be both "yes" and "no."
Certainly parts of Chapter 11 as it now exists grant the court substantial
flexibility. The exclusivity provision, section 1121, is an example. A court
can shorten or extend the period for cause.171 In practice, however,
reductions in exclusivity almost never occur, whereas extensions are often
routine. The merits of proposed changes to section 1121 designed to counter
this exercise of judicial discretion will be discussed below. But is it
necessary to create a separate chapter to deal with this problem? If a court
wants to extend exclusivity, it can just as well make a finding that the
extension is "substantially justified" in Chapter 10 as it could find that
"cause" is shown in Chapter 11. And, even if the belief is that a different
express standard is needed to discipline judges, that change could be
accomplished within section 1121 itself. Section 1121 could be amended to

167. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1026(a)(4)).
168. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1026(b)(2)).
169. See 124 CONG. REC. H11,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REc.

S17,419 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 223-24, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6183 ("The bill adopts a consolidated chapter for all business
reorganizations.. . . It adopts much of the flexibility of Chapter XI of current law, and
incorporates the essence of the public protection features of current Chapter X.").
170. In introducing S. 1985 in the 102d Congress, Senator Heflin stated: "The current
code is required to handle both the corporate reorganizations of a multibillion-dollar
international company and that of the small, rural grocery store. Trying to make the
same set of laws apply to vastly different corporate enterprises has created problems and
inefficiencies in the handling of individual bankruptcy cases." 137 CONG. REc. S17,047
(daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1988).
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provide that extensions for debtors with $2.5 million or less in debts may
only be granted if "substantially justified". This aspect of Chapter 10 does
not in any respect appear to dictate an entirely separate chapter.
Other of the changes included in proposed Chapter 10 could likewise
be accomplished by amendment of Chapter 11, or simply by judicial
interpretation of existing provisions. Many of the innovations effected by
Judge Small in North Carolina suggest the potential of this approach.172
Appointment of creditors' committees could be made optional, reflecting
actual practice in many small cases. The disclosure statement standards in
section 1125 are very open-ended, and minimal disclosure could be allowed.
Time savings could be realized by folding the disclosure statement approval
hearing into the confirmation hearing. Strict time standards for all hearings
could be set by the court.
Other changes do go substantially beyond current Chapter 11. Most
notable are the complete disenfranchisement of creditors and equity holders,
permanent exclusivity for the debtor, and the accompanying abrogation of
the absolute priority rule. If these changes are deemed desirable, then there
really is no point to trying to bend Chapter 11 around to fit. A separate
chapter would be the way to go. I would note, however, that it might be
easier in this event simply to amend Chapter 13 by expanding the pool of
eligible debtors to include corporations and partnerships and raising the debt
ceiling than to enact a whole separate small-business chapter that essentially
copies Chapter 13.1
On the merits of these proposals of disenfranchisement, permanent
exclusivity, and elimination of absolute priority, reasonable people again can
differ. My own personal bias is against the proposed changes. I think they
would vest too much power in the hands of the debtor and would allow the
debtor to capture almost all of the going-concern surplus."' The supposed
protection that all disposable income must be committed to the plan for three

172. Indeed, Judge Small's program inspired the drafting of Chapter 10. See 137
CONG. REc. S17,057 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Grassley). For a
description of the program, see Hon. A. Thomas Small, Small Business Bankruptcy
Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. RaV. 305 (1993); see also Greenwald, supra note 16,

at 61.
173. This suggestion has also been made by Akard, supra note 155, at 17; Ray, supra
note 155, at 35.
174. In this respect, I tend to agree with Senator Hatch, who filed "Additional Views"
on S. REP. No. 168, supranote 64, at 60 ("[I]n my opinion, it is ill advised to deprive
unsecured creditors of the power to vote and to capture the going concern value of the
business."). Also, the National Bankruptcy Conference opposes Chapter 10, objecting
in particular to the lack of a creditor vote and the grant of permanent exclusivity to the

debtor. Detailed Statement of Position of the National Bankruptcy Conference on S.540,
reprintedin S. REP. No. 168, supranote 64, at 62.
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years175 is, I believe, largely illusory. In the context of a business, I
suspect courts will have an extraordinarily hard time defining "disposable
income," and that doubts will be resolved in favor of the debtor. The
76
definition of disposable income in section 1001 is necessarily vague.1
Indeed, the concept really does not even make sense in the context of a
business. What is "necessary for the continuation, preservation, and
operation of the debtor's business" depends on the business philosophy of
the debtor. For example, there is no single right answer as to how much
should be paid in dividends as opposed to how much should be reinvested
in the business.
For these reasons, I would oppose a separate Chapter 10. If, however,
the policy decision is made that for most small businesses the going-concern
surplus should be allocated almost entirely to existing owners because of the
person-specific values generated by those owners, then some form of
separate chapter makes sense. I do not think notions of cost and time should
control the decision, however, because similar savings can be realized
within the confines of existing Chapter 11. Having said that, it seems that
the primary stated motivation behind the Chapter 10 movement is to save
time and money.' 77 If that is true, then I would strongly urge revising
Chapter 11 practice, not creating a whole new chapter.
I have not spoken to the constitutional problem that might be created
7
if Chapter 10 is adopted on a pilot district basis, as S. 540 proposes. 1 I
have focused rather on the merits of Chapter 10. The constitutional issue is
whether adoption in only eight judicial districts would violate the uniformity
requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause.' 79 Many believe that there is a
substantial chance that it would. 8 ' I agree. The defense urged is that only
"geographical" uniformity is required; however, it is hard to see how even
that test would be met in this instance. Unlike the pilot program for United
States Trustees, which dealt only with the mechanics of bankruptcy

175. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.

§ 1026(b)(2)).
176. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1001) defines "disposable income" as "income that is received by a debtor and that is
not reasonably necessary to be expended for payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and operation of the debtor's business."
177. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 39.
178. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 201(e).
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 gives Congress the power to enact "uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies."
180. Senator Hatch raised this question in his "Additional Views" to S. REP. No. 168,
supra note 64, at 60; see also Detailed Statement of Position of the National Bankruptcy
Conference on S. 540, reprinted in S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 61-62; ABI
LEGIS. BULL. (Am. Bankr. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 20, 1993.
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administration, Chapter 10 would affect the substantive rights of the parties.
The pending Chapter 10 proposal bears a much closer resemblance to the
legislation that was struck down by the Supreme Court in Railway Labor
Executives' Ass' v. Gibbons. 8' If Congress feels compelled to give
Chapter 10 a trial, I would urge nationwide adoption to obviate the
constitutional problem.
V. CHAPTER 11 REFORM PROPOSALS

A. Overview
One of the predominant criticisms of Chapter I I is that it takes too
long. Studies have shown an increase in the average time spent in Chapter
11, in the range of one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half years."n The sense is
that operating in Chapter 11 has become an end in itself, rather than simply
a temporary way station en route to the end of a confirmed plan and a
restructured business.
As might be expected, the concern that Chapter 11 cases are taking too
long leads naturally to the charge that Chapter 11 cases cost too much.
Undoubtedly the best way to cut the cost of Chapter 11 cases is to reduce
the time debtors spend in Chapter 11. 83 In addition, other direct ways of
cutting costs may exist.
Many factors contribute to the time and cost problem, and I will
address a number of possible remedies. Commonly cited culprits include:
(1) Debtor retention of exclusivity." ' The concern is that debtors who
retain exclusivity can present a reorganization plan favorable to their own
interests on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and essentially wait out the creditors,
who eventually will be forced either to risk a liquidation by calling the
debtor's bluff or to accede to the debtor's plan.
(2) Lack of an "absolute" absolute priority rule. 5 Tied in with the
exclusivity problem is the fact that even for an insolvent company, creditors
can agree to give up value to equity interests. This may prompt otherwise
out-of-the-money constituencies to play a hold-up game by stalling the case
until creditors let equity have a slice of the pie.
(3) "Too many cooks spoil the broth."186 To use another metaphor,
too many players are sitting at the negotiating table, with their ante being
paid by the bankruptcy estate. This makes bargaining more complex and

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

455 U.S. 457 (1982).
See Altman, supranote 10, at 3-4; LoPucki, supra note 12, at 739-45.
See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 730-31.
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 40; see infra part V.B.
See infra part V.J.
See infra part V.H.
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reduces the incentive for these groups to agree to a deal.
(4) Professional fees are too high.1" Related to the prior problem is
the fact that many lawyers are receiving very large fees from the bankruptcy
estate, especially in big cases. These professionals supposedly have little
incentive to bring the case to a quick conclusion and thereby kill their
golden goose.
(5) Safe haven for managers. Some claim that the debtor's management
finds Chapter 11 a safe place to hold on to their jobs in the face of hostile
creditor groups. They thus have little incentive to exit from Chapter 11 and
put their jobs back on the line. This criticism sounds damning, but in fact
is largely erroneous. Studies have shown that most debtor managers lose
their jobs. If they are seeking a safe haven in Chapter 11, the evidence
suggests that they are uninformed.18s
(6) Time is not money.189 Interest does not have to be paid in Chapter
11. 1' Debtors thus have a competitive advantage simply because they are
in Chapter 11, an advantage they may be loathe to relinquish.
(7) Soft judges. Finally, the allegation is made that bankruptcy judges
are too lenient to debtors and are too unwilling to pull the plug on hopeless
cases.
Many of these problems do exist. Happily, it might be possible to deal
with many of them at least in part by providential amendment of the
Bankruptcy Code. At the same time, Congress can only do so much. At
some point bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy lawyers must change their
attitudes. Judges have to get serious about keeping Chapter 11 cases going
and writing them off when realistic hope is gone. Lawyers need to counsel
against throwing hopeless debtors into Chapter 11. The innovative program
installed by Judge Small is indicative of what an aggressive judge can do
within the confines of the existing Code.191 Many other examples illustrate, to the contrary, that recalcitrant judges can frustrate congressional
attempts to require expedition.
One "speed" and "cost" saving proposal, of course, is to enact a
separate small business chapter, such as Chapter 10, which I just discussed." 9 This would hurry the case by imposing stricter deadlines for
filing a plan and for conducting a confirmation hearing, and by eliminating

187. See infra part V.I.
188. See infra note 378 and accompanying text.
189. See infra part V.G.

190. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988) (disallowing claims for unmatured interest at the
time of the bankruptcy filing); cf. id. § 506(b) (allowing postpetition interest to the extent
a claim is oversecured).
191. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
192. See supra Part IV.
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or restricting some of the current steps in the Chapter 11 process, such as
the disclosure statement hearing 93 and the solicitation of the vote. 94 As
I stated in my discussion of Chapter 10, however, it seems that most of
these proposals could be implemented in the context of Chapter 11 itself,
while those that could not are premised more on distributional determinations than on savings of time and money.
So, let me now turn to a consideration of some of these other proposals.
These include:
(1) limit the debtor's retention of the exclusive right to file a plan; 95
(2) expand the powers of the bankruptcy judge to speed up the
case;1 96
(3) make stay relief determinations more expeditious;
(4) require a threshold finding of feasibility, either at the outset of the
case or at some early juncture;' 98
(5) require debtors to pay interest during the pendency of the case; 199
(6) reduce the number of committees, and reduce the fees paid to these
committees; 2'
(7) reduce professional fees;20'
(8) tighten up the absolute priority rule and the so-called "new value
exception" ;202
(9) make pre-packaged plans easier to confirm; 0 3 and
(10) facilitate major asset sales.2°0
After I discuss these suggestions, I will focus on a final suggested
reform, namely to appoint a trustee or an examiner in every case. 205 This
proposal would in theory address several of the criticisms of Chapter 11.

193. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(a).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b), (C); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3017(d).
195. S.540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 102 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
1121(d)); see infra part V.B.

196. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 105 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
105(d)); see infra part V.C.

197. S.540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 101 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
362(e)); see infra part V.D.
198. See infra part V.F.

199. See infra part V.G.
200. See infra part V.H.
201. S.540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 309 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
330(a)); see infra part V.I.
202. See infra part V.J.
203. See infra part V.K.
204. See infra part V.L.
205. See infra part V.M.
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B. Limit Debtor's Exclusivity

Perhaps the reform suggestion most commonly raised is to limit the
debtor's exclusive right to file a reorganization plan.20 6 The perception is
that the norm in Chapter 11 practice today is for debtors to retain exclusivity for the duration of the case. Notwithstanding the apparent dictate of
section 1121 that 120 days should be the normal exclusive period,'
courts routinely extend exclusivity, sometimes for years.20 8 But Congress
did not want to give the debtor unlimited exclusivity, because, in the words
of the 1977 House Report, "Creditors are excluded. The exclusive right
gives the debtor undue bargaining leverage, because by delay he can force
a settlement out of otherwise unwilling creditors .
"..."209
With exclusivity in place, the argument goes, cases last longer, as each
side tries to wait out the other. This delay, in turn, drives up the cost of the
proceedings. This characterization of the nexus between exclusivity and
delay is not universally accepted, of course. The National Bankruptcy
Conference takes the view that criticism of exclusivity as a "culprit in
delay . . . is ill informed and false,"2 10 arguing instead that "the real cause
[of delay] is the failure of constituencies to arrive at common ground
through negotiation."21
This whole problem is a fascinating case study in the relationship
between Congress and the courts. In reviewing not only the literal terms of
the Code but the legislative history as well, it appears that Congress
intended for 120 days to be the standard practice and did not expect or want
routine extensions to occur.212 The courts, however, have largely frustrat-

206. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 10, at 4; LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice,
supra note 9, at 48; LoPucki & Whitford, CorporateGovernance, supra note 9, at 788;
Whitman, supra note 10, at 860; Greenwald, supra note 16, at 61; Passell, supra note
16, at C9; Wechsler, Money to Burn?, supra note 16, at 72.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (c)(2), (d) (1988).
208. See Altman, supra note 10, at 4; LoPucki, supra note 12, at 753; see also
Richard M. Cieri et al., Applying an Ax when a Scalpel Will Do: The Role of Exclusivity
in Chapter 11 Reform, 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 397, 410 (1993).
209. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 231, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6191.
210. The Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1993: Hearings on S.540 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts andAdmin. Practiceof the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,Statement
of Position of the NationalBankruptcy Conference on S.540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1993) [hereinafter Statement of Position of NBC on S.540].
211. Id. at 11.
212. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 232, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6191 ("In most cases, 120 days will give the debtor adequate time to negotiate a
settlement, without unduly delaying creditors.").
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

35

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:791

ed the congressional intent. What is to be done? The choices effectively boil
down to two: (1) Congress can still leave the courts some flexibility to deal
with the mega-cases--a Manville is not going to settle quickly no matter
what-but at the same time can tell the courts "we really mean it" that
extensions are to be the exception and not the rule; or, (2) the courts can
have all of their discretion stripped away, and an absolute time bar can be
implemented. In any event, a remarkable consensus exists that something
must be done.2 13
Proposed legislation in the 102d2 14 and 103d Congress has followed
the "we really mean it" school of thought. Section 102 of S. 540 would add
a provision to section 1121(d) placing an almost absolute one-year limit on
debtor exclusivity for filing." 5 The "almost" is that Congress left an out;
the one-year limit would apply "unless the need for such an increase is
attributable to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable." 21 6 That, of course, opens up a whole can of worms as to
when the debtor should or should not "justly be held accountable." If the
debtor and the creditors are at loggerheads and neither will give in to the
other, is that a circumstance for which the debtor should or should not justly
be held accountable? The answer to that question will dictate in part the
bargaining position that the respective groups can take.
Despite the obvious intent of Congress to make extensions of exclusivity beyond one year harder to come by, 217 in actuality it is possible that the
proposed new standard would not have any significant effect at all. Under
current law it is hard to imagine that a court would find "cause" to grant an
extension of the debtor's exclusive right if the court were persuaded that
the need for an extension was driven by circumstances for which the debtor
should "justly be held accountable." The proposed amendment might have
an effect, however, if it serves to catch the attention of bankruptcy judges
and wake them up to the real intention of Congress. My suspicion, however,

213. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 10, at 4; Cieri et al., supra note 208, at 422;
LoPucki, supra note 12, at 756; Whitman, supra note 10, at 859-60.
214. S. 1985, Final Version, supra note 63, § 102 (to be codified at I1 U.S.C. §
1121(d)).
215. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 102 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
1121(d)).
216. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)).
217. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 40 explains that "[o]ften, these extensions
lead to unnecessary and expensive delay in the pendency of the chapter 11 case." In
connection with the 1992 legislation, Representative Fish observed that "we seek to
discourage long postponements for filing proposed reorganization plans-in recognition
of the potential harm that can result from delay." 138 CONG. REc. H11,057 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Fish).
218. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1988).
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is that judges already know very well what Congress intended; they just
think they know better. Some concern has been expressed that the proposed
new standard would place unwarranted restraints on the discretion of
bankruptcy judges in deciding whether to extend exclusivity.2 19 The

debate, I suppose, is over what restraints are warranted; many feel that
current law falls short of the proper mark and that the proposed change
would be beneficial.'
The question then is whether the other approach, an absolute limit on
exclusivity with no exceptions at all, would be preferable either to current
law or to the pending proposal. The most obvious criticism of an absolutist
approach is, of course, that it would be totally inflexible.2 Some cases
by their size and complexity simply cannot be resolved in a relatively short
period of time, such as a year. All of the studies show an average time in
Chapter 11 for large, publicly held companies in excess of a year. 2 Yet,
the answer cannot be to extend the absolute time limit to account for the
longest expected case, for that then would eviscerate the meaningfulness of
the limitation for the great bulk of cases that could be concluded in a shorter
time period.
Here is a situation where two different rules for large and small
companies might be merited. The LoPucki and Whitford study also showed
that most of the large cases were successful, in that a plan was confirmed.23 This success ratio departs rather dramatically from the very
weak performance of smaller cases.24 In short, the time appears wellspent in a large case, but not in smaller cases. One possible solution then
might be to impose an absolute cap on exclusivity for small, non-public
companies, but not to impose one for large, publicly held companies.
If one accepts that any absolute exclusivity limit, to be meaningful and
useful, must cut off a certain percentage of cases, the question then becomes
what happens in those cases in which exclusivity does expire. By definition,
of course, what it means is that any party in interest can file a plan. What
then happens to the bargaining dynamic? When exclusivity terminates, does
everybody quit talking to each other and negotiating, and go off and file
their own plan?' Or, do the creditors continue to talk to the debtor and
219. See ABI LEGIs. BULL. (Am. Bankr. Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 20, 1993.
220. See, e.g., CLEVELAND BAR Ass'N, REPORT ON SENATE BILL 540: BANKRUPTCY
AMENDMENTS OF 1993 (1993) [hereinafter CLEVELAND BAR Ass'N REPORT].

221. See Cieri et al., supra note 208, at 422-23; Rosen, supra note 14, at 48.
222. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 739-45 (discussing the results of various studies).
223. LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 9, at 600-01.
224. See Flynn, supra note 49, at 13.
225. This is the scenario the National Bankruptcy Conference paints in opposing any
changes to the current exclusivity rules. In Statement of Position of NBC on S. 540,
supra note 210, at 11, the NBC argues: "[B]y extending exclusivity for the debtor, the
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each other, with the only important consequence being that the debtor has
lost a bargaining chip?
The truth probably lies somewhere in between those extremes. In a
sense, it is difficult to make a knowledgeable prediction as to what would
happen, because there is so little experience under the Code in cases where
the debtor did lose exclusivity. The experience under Chapter X of the Act
probably cannot be imported very helpfully to inform the discussion,
because the whole scheme there was so different, with a mandatory trustee
and the active participation of the SEC in every case. 26
It does seem that imposition of an absolute exclusivity limit would favor
creditors relatively as opposed to debtors and equity. Creditors would know
that at some known point in the future they would be able to put forward
their own plan, and to cram it down over the objections of the debtor. This
knowledge undoubtedly would color the preceding negotiations and could
lead to a more favorable allocation of reorganization value to creditor
interests. It is doubtful that equity holders would be cut out entirely on a
routine basis, because an elimination of equity interests would require a full
valuation of the company under the fair and equitable cramdown test.
Creditors are believed to be averse to such a valuation.
I think that, in at least some cases, the presence of an exclusivity
limitation would likely decrease the length of the proceedings. The debtor
would know that holding out forever would not work, and thus it might as
well cut a deal with creditors sooner rather than later. Indeed, debtors may
be able to trade time for money directly with the creditors. In effect, the
debtor could say to the creditors, "you will have to wait a year for
exclusivity to expire, and I could stall you until then. If you will give equity
a little bigger piece of the pie, however, I will file a plan in four months.
You thus save eight months-a fair trade for a little bonus for equity."
At the same time, the foregoing hypothetical suggests that imposing an
absolute one-year time limit may have the unintended effect of actually
increasing the time in some cases. I think that it is not unrealistic to project
that judges under such a system would be even more inclined almost always
to give the debtor a year to work things out. In many of the smaller cases
it is doubtful whether that much time is needed.
Proponents of an absolute exclusivity limit also must admit that in some

judge keeps all parties talking together. When exclusivity is lifted, the danger arises that
each constituency, usually at great expense to the debtor, will run up time drafting its
own plan. This produces a Tower-of-Babel turf fight that is nearly impossible to
resolve."
226. For brief summaries of Chapter X practice, see 124 CONG. REc. HI 1,101 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. S17,417 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); H.R. REP. No.
595, supranote 2, at 221-23, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6181-83; COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 241-45.
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cases the bargaining dynamic will fall apart once exclusivity terminates, or
is about to terminate. Giving creditors more leverage inevitably will lead to
occasional abuses of that leverage. The questions are how often this will
occur and whether the costs exceed the benefits projected from adopting
exclusivity. Absent a crystal ball, I find it hard to make that judgment. At
bottom, I find it sad that bankruptcy judges cannot be entrusted with the
discretion to make the right call on a case-by-case basis. Part of me wants
to give the judges one more chance.
C. Expand Powers of Judges
Perhaps that chance could come in part in the form of an amendment
to section 105, such as that proposed in S. 540.1 7 As originally envisioned in S. 1985, in lieu of imposing a cap on exclusivity, the amendment
would have added a new section 1121(e), authorizing the bankruptcy judge
to hold a status conference and to issue orders "to ensure that the case is
handled expeditiously and economically."22 Examples of the types of
orders that might be entered are to set a date to file a disclosure statement;
to set a date for confirmation; to set a date for other parties to file a plan;
and to provide for folding the disclosure statement hearing into the
confirmation hearing. These provisions track very neatly the procedures set
up by Judge Small in his highly regarded "fast-track" Chapter 11(a)
system. 9 The final version of the conference bill to S. 1985 placed this
provision in a new section 105(d), 23 as does current S. 540.1' Without
detailing the types of orders that might be entered, this amendment would
empower the bankruptcy judge to hold a status conference and to issue
orders that, again, would help "ensure that the case is handled expeditiously
and economically. "'
In one sense the proposed amendment to section 105 is probably
unnecessary, as bankruptcy judges already possess the power to hold status
conferences and issue the types of orders described in the proposed
subsection.3 3 It may be, however, that absent express language to that

227. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 105 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
105(d)).
228. S. 1985, Passed Version, supra note 57, § 209 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
1121(e)).
229. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
230. S. 1985, Final Version, supra note 63, § 105 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
105(d)).
231. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 105 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.

§
§

§
§

105(d)).
232. Id.
233. For a good discussion of what judges currently can do and are doing, see Hon.
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effect, some judges may be reticent to take such aggressive case management steps. If adding a new section 105(d) might encourage some judges to
move forward in this respect, then it might be worthwhile.
Harking back to the discussion in the last section, my own preference
is that an absolute cap on exclusivity should be deferred for now in favor of
trying the status conference approach. The rigidity of an absolute time limit
and the impact of such a limit on negotiations are serious concerns. An
absolute limit is a "second-best" solution. The best solution is for judges to
police the time spent wisely in chapter. Perhaps the impetus to hold status
conferences following from an express amendment to the Code would
facilitate that result.
D. Expedite Stay Relief
A related problem is how to expedite stay-relief proceedings.134 In
many cases the determination on an application for stay relief serves as an
early judgment on the feasibility of the case. This has been particularly true
since the Timbers case, in which the Supreme Court in dictum approved the6
view that section 362(d)(2)(B) 5 includes a feasibility component. 1
Stay actions thus provide an opportunity for the court to terminate terminal
cases at an early point.
But that function is realized only if the courts actually decide stay-relief
motions expeditiously. The practice often is for stay-relief determinations to
be delayed. Again, this contravenes the clear intent of Congress in 1978 to
place strict time deadlines on applications for relief from the stay. 7
Samuel Bufford, Status Conferences in Chapter 11 Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr.
1993, at 14. For additional discussion of the role of the bankruptcy judge in case
management, see Hon. Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causesof Delay and Expense
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 311-15 (1993). Judge
Fenning predicted that by the end of the century, judges will routinely set deadlines for
filing plans at the status conference, and will rarely extend the deadline. Fenning, supra
note 10, at 116.
234. In supporting the 1992 legislation, Representative Fish grouped the goal of
"facilitat[ing] more expeditious resolutions of requests for relief from the automatic stay"
with the limitation of exclusivity, toward the end of limiting "the potential harm that can
result from delay." 138 CONG. REc. HI 1,057 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep.
Fish).
235. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1988) provides that relief shall be granted with respect
to the stay of an act against property if the debtor lacks equity (§ 362(d)(1)) and "such

property is not necessary to an effective reorganization." (emphasis added). The question
is whether the reference to an "effective" reorganization adds a requirement independent

of the "necessity" test.
236. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 375-76
(1988).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 175, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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Current section 362(e) provides that, with respect to the stay of any act
against property of the estate, the stay will terminate by operation of law
thirty days after the stay request, unless the court orders the stay continued
in effect pending the conclusion of a final hearing."s The section then
provides that the final hearing must be commenced within thirty days after
the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. 239 However, section 362(e) is
silent as to when that final hearing must be concluded. At one time, Rule
4001 contained another thirty-day provision, requiring the final hearing to
be concluded within thirty days after it was commenced. However, that
provision was dropped in 1991.240
Another proposed amendment to the Code would amend section 362(e)
to change the provision that the final hearing be commenced within thirty
days after the preliminary hearing to a requirement that the final hearing be
concluded in that thirty-day period.24' A similar provision was contained
in the final version of S. 1985.242 The version of S. 1985 that passed the
Senate in June 1992 added the two thirty-day periods together and provided
that the final hearing had to be concluded within sixty days after the filing
of the request. 243
As with the exclusivity cap, however, the question still remains whether
the time limitation should be absolute or whether the bankruptcy judge
should be given discretion to expand the time. All of the versions of section
362(e) proposed in the 102d and 103d Congresses opted to give the judge
an out. In the version of S. 1985 that passed the Senate, the exception was

at 6136 ("The bill ...provides that unless the court acts quickly, the relief is automatic
on request by a creditor. Too often today, court delay in handling requests for relief
amounts to a complete denial of relief.... The bill prevents such action."); id. at 344,

reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6300 ("Subsection (e) provides a protection for
secured creditors that is not available under present law. the subsection sets a time
certain within which the bankruptcy court must rule.... If the court does not rule
within 30 days from a request for relief from the stay, the stay is automatically

terminated with respect to the property in question.").
238. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e).
239. Id.
240. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(2) (1987) (repealed 1991). The Advisory Committee
Note to the 1991 change states that "Subdivision (a)(2) is deleted as unnecessary because
of § 362(e) of the Code." FED. R. BANKR. P. advisory committee notes to 1991
amendments (1991).
241. S.540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 101 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
362(e)).
242. S. 1985, Final Version, supra note 63, § 101 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
362(e)).
243. S.1985, Passed Version, supra note 57, § 304 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
362(e)).
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for a finding of "good cause."2" The final version that came out of
conference required a stronger showing of "compelling circumstances;' 245this stricter standard has been incorporated in S. 540.246 Again,
as with the exclusivity limit, once an exception is allowed, the prospect of
wholesale evasion of congressional intent presents itself.
Having said that, it nevertheless is probably not a good idea to require
a final up or down decision in sixty days in every case. This is especially
true given the need for the court to make a feasibility decision at the stay
hearing. The problem would be less severe if the Koopman 47 view that
only necessity need be shown were the prevailing approach.
However, even if an absolute limit were enacted, courts still could get
around it. One way would be to hold for the debtor at the final stay hearing,
continuing the stay in effect for a limited period of time, conditioned on the
provision of adequate protection. Since a stay-relief determination is not res
judicata, such a holding would not finally and irrevocably decide the matter.
Even if such an approach were not available, the court could invoke its
section 105 powers and issue an injunction.
All in all, enactment of some sort of time limit on stay determinations
probably is a good idea.24 8 Doing so again might serve as a sort of
congressional encouragement to judges to keep the ball rolling,249 without
really hurting any live cases. The benefits may be marginal, but the
downside seems almost nonexistent.

244. Id.
245. S. 1985, Final Version, supra note 63, § 101 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
362(e)).
246. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 101 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
362(e)).
247. Empire Enters. v. Koopmans (In re Koopmans), 22 B.R. 395 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982).
248. The National Bankruptcy Conference supports the idea, as long as the court
retains the ability to grant extensions when justified. Statement of Positionof NBC on S.
540, supra note 210, at 9. Other groups, however, feel that the proposed amendment
would deprive the court of needed flexibility by creating too stringent a standard for
granting extensions. See CLEVELAND BAR ASS'N REPORT, supra note 220.
249. Representative Fish explained that the purpose of the proposed amendment would
be "to provide parties with as much certainty as possible that final hearings on requests
for relief from the automatic stay will be concluded expeditiously." 138 CONG. REc.
H11,057 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Fish). He then elaborated in some
detail that the "compelling circumstances" test was to be taken seriously, and contemplated only such things as tornados and sick judges; crowded court dockets and vague
promises of white knights would not suffice. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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E. Single-Asset Real Estate Cases
Single-asset real estate cases present distinct problems. Many bankruptcy observers feel that these cases have at best a marginal justification for
being in Chapter 11 at all. Most of these cases are essentially two-party
disputes, between the investors and the secured creditor. Accordingly, many
courts have dismissed single-asset filings, either on a bad-faith analysis or

by granting relief from the stay to permit the secured creditor (to foreclose.
Others, however, have not, and secured creditors have been tied up in court
while the debtor tries to salvage its investment.
Several substantive rules make the problem more acute. One is the fact
that, under Timbers, pendency interest need not be paid to the creditor if the
debtor is undersecured, 2 0 which is almost always true in these cases. One
possible reform is to overrule Timbers, which will be discussed below."
Combined with the Timbers rule is the uncertain state of the new-value
exception to the absolute priority rule.' 2 If that exception is recognized,
it becomes much easier for the debtor to cram down a plan over the
objection of the secured creditor. The primary counter to this trend is the
recent rulings in cases such as Greystone"3 and Bryson Properties,"
which impose classification limits that may prevent the debtor from
proposing a plan that satisfies section 1129(a)(10). 2 1 Another possible
reform would be to tighten up the absolute priority rule and perhaps limit
or eliminate the new-value exception.

6

250. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988).
251. See infra part V.G.
252. See infra part V.J.
253. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone I Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
254. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties XVIm (In re Bryson Properties XVIII),
961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988) requires at least one impaired class to accept the
plan if any classes are impaired. In single-asset cases, the major creditor often is so
undersecured that the unsecured portion of its claim gives it the power to control the
unsecured class vote, thereby preventing the debtor from satisfying § 1129(a)(10) and
confirming the plan. If the debtor is allowed to separate that undersecured creditor out
into a another class, however, then the remaining trade creditors may well vote in favor
of the plan.
256. To cram down a plan over the objection of a dissenting unsecured creditor class,
the plan either must pay that class in full or must give nothing to classes junior to the
dissenting class. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B). This would mean that equity shares would
be cancelled. The "new value" exception allows equity holders to retain an ownership
interest in the reorganized debtor by contributing "new value" to the debtor. The theory
is that the retained value is on account of the new contribution, not the old equity
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Many approaches could be taken to deal with the single-asset problem.
The most drastic would simply be to make single-asset debtors ineligible for
Chapter 11 relief, as a blanket rule. Doing so would give effect to the
notion that bankruptcy intervention is only necessary or appropriate to solve
a collective action problem. Other less dramatic forms of intervention also
have been suggested. S. 1985"5 and now S. 540" provide for limited
relief for secured creditors, in the context of section 362. One change would
be to add a new section 362(i), which would require the court to permit the
creditor to continue a previously commenced foreclosure proceeding up to,
but not including, the point of sale in a single-asset real estate case.259
Under state law, the foreclosure process often involves a series of steps that
take a certain discrete period of time. The problem creditors have encountered is that after they start the process, the debtor files Chapter 11 and
stays the process; even when stay relief is granted, the entire remaining state
statutory time period still has to run 6° The proposed amendment simply
would allow the creditor to run through the entire state foreclosure process
during the bankruptcy case even while the stay was in effect, so that if the
bankruptcy court does eventually decide to lift the stay, the foreclosure sale
could occur immediately. 261 This change is a positive one, as it helps the
creditor without really damaging the debtor, since the sale itself is still
stayed until the court finds for the creditor under section 362(d).
S. 1985"62 and now S. 540263 also would add a more controversial
provision by enacting a new ground for stay relief in single-asset real estate
cases as section 362(d)(3). Under this proposal, the debtor would be given
a ninety-day grace period after filing. At the ninety-day mark, however, the
stay would be lifted unless the debtor either (1) files a feasible plan, or (2)
commences making monthly interest payments to the creditor. 2" In effect,
if the debtor wants more than ninety days to work out a feasible plan, it
would have to pay for the privilege. While this proposal did not survive into

interest. See infra part V.J.
257. S. 1985, Passed Version, supra note 57, § 211(b) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.

§§ 362(d)(3), 362(i)).
258. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 202 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
101, 362(d), 362(i)).
259. Id. § 202(b)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(i)).
260. 138 CONG. REc. S8264-65 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Reid).
261. S. 540, Reported Version, supranote 64, § 202(b)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(i)).
262. S. 1985, Passed Version, supra note 57, § 211 (b)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(d)(3)).
263. S. 540, Reported Version, supranote 64, § 202(b)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(3)).
264. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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the final conference version of S. 1985,26 it267 was resurrected in S.
540.266 Its chief sponsor is Senator Grassley,
the ranking minority
member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, who was responding to the
pleas of institutional secured lenders, such as insurance companies, that they
were being held up in Chapter 11 for indefinite periods without compensation. Whether one favors or disfavors the proposed section 362(d)(3)
depends almost entirely on how one wants to cast the balance of power
between the debtor and the secured creditor in single-asset cases.
F. Require Threshold FeasibilityFinding
Another reform that has been suggested is to require the court to make
a threshold finding that the Chapter 11 case is feasible. The projected
benefit would be that hopeless cases could be exposed early on and would
not be dragged out for extended periods of time. The dismal overall success
rate of Chapter 11 cases suggests that a veritable army of candidates for
early dismissal exist.
The Bankruptcy Code presently permits this form of relief, except that
a hearing on feasibility is permissive rather than mandatory. Section 1112(b)
authorizes the court to dismiss a case or convert it to Chapter 7 on request
of a party in interest or the United States Trustee for "cause. "268 The
"absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation" 69 is one of the
enumerated statutory grounds for dismissing or converting a case. Furthermore, feasibility may be determined in a stay-relief hearing under section
362(d)(2)(B),270 as noted above.
The proposal thus must contemplate that the existing permissive nature
of the sections just mentioned undercuts their utility. It is difficult to see
why this should be so, however. Both an independent overseer, the United
States Trustee, and all parties in interest are authorized to put the feasibility
issue before the court. If no one with a stake in the proceedings or the
independent administrative officer is concerned enough about feasibility to
bring the question to the attention of the court, why should we care? One of
the official duties of the creditors' committee under section 1103 is to
"investigate the financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the
debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such busi-

265. S. 1985, Final Version, supra note 63.
266. S. 540, Reported Version, supranote 64, § 202(b)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(3)).
267. 138 CONG. REC. S8251 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).

268. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1988).

269. Id. § 1112(b)(1).
270. Id. § 362(d)(2)(B).
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ness."271 If the committee does not seek a dismissal or conversion, does
that not suggest at least some belief in feasibility and some willingness to
give the case a chance?
Perhaps not. What may be going on is that most creditors perceive that
a section 1112(b) motion brought early in a large Chapter 11 case has little
chance of succeeding. If that is true, there is no point in wasting the time
and money to tilt at windmills. Many bankruptcy judges have a strong
inclination to give the reorganization a try. Again, then, we are back in the
realm of the bankruptcy court exercising its discretion in a way that
frustrates the operation of the Chapter 11 system. One could argue that
forcing the bankruptcy court to make an express feasibility finding will only
add time and expense to the Chapter 11 case, without changing the results
at all; the court still will routinely let cases proceed.
Yet, maybe we should not be so pessimistic. Judges generally view
section 1112 as an extreme remedy, to be utilized only in extraordinary
cases. If Congress were to enact a separate provision mandating a feasibility
finding and make clear that the court's duty was to make an honest finding,
it is possible that bankruptcy judges would honor the congressional directive
and dismiss more cases. This latter scenario is more likely to come to pass
if the feasibility determination is postponed for some period of time, so that
the debtor is given some opportunity to put a plan together, or least make
progress in that direction. A plausible candidate for the timing of the
feasibility hearing would be at 120 days, to tie in with the 120-day
exclusivity period.272
The feasibility determination would be more substantial if the United
States Trustee were required to make a formal recommendation to the court
on the issue. One of the stated justifications for a separate small-business
chapter, be it a new Chapter 10 or a modified Chapter 13, is that an
independent observer, the standing trustee, would be in a position to advise
the court on the likelihood of reorganization.273 A similar function could
be carried out in Chapter 11. Under old Chapter X, the SEC performed this
role,274 but no longer does so in the same way under the Code.
The concern about an independent recommendation is, of course, the
time and cost of the investigation that would be necessary. The staffs of the
U.S. Trustee offices probably are not adequate at this point to take on such
a task. An alternative possibility would be to farm out the job. The court
could appoint an investigator (examiner?)275 in each Chapter 11 case to
271. Id.§ 1103(c)(2).
272. Id.§ 1121(b).
273. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 64, at 40.
274. Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 172-73, 52 Stat. 840, 890-91 (1938) (repealed 1978);
see H.R. RP. No. 595, supranote 2, at 225, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6185.

275. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) authorizes the court to appoint an examiner if the
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study the debtor and make a formal recommendation on feasibility. This
would of course significantly increase costs. The question would be whether
the costs expended on the examiner would be outweighed by the savings
from the mercy killings of terminal cases.
Another possibility would be to require the creditors' committee to
make a formal report on feasibility. This would not require the creation of
any new players and would allow the court to capitalize on the existing
knowledge of creditors, who are the parties most likely to know the debtor's
strengths and weaknesses. An objection would be that the creditors are not
disinterested, and giving them a virtual veto over the reorganization would
greatly shift the balance of power. Because of that factor alone, the
creditors' committee approach probably would never be adopted.
A further problem is that it depends on an able and active creditors'
committee. In some cases such a committee exists, but in many it does not;
creditor apathy instead prevails.276 Thus the committee in many instances
would be forced to hire an independent financial examiner. If such a person
is going to have to be hired anyway, it is probably preferable for them to
report either to the court or to the U.S. Trustee, and not to one of the
groups with a stake in the outcome of the proceedings.
G. Compel Debtor to Pay Interest During Pendency of Case
All of the proposals to save time and money that have been discussed
so far look to Congress or the courts or perhaps to an independent
administrator to ride herd on the case and keep it moving. The Supreme
Court in Timbers suggested this tack as a palliative to its denial of interest
to undersecured creditors.277 This may be the wrong focus, however. In
some respects this approach may be ill-fated from the start, for it involves
an outside agency trying to impose restrictions on the affected parties. Far
better, perhaps, is to structure the system so that the parties themselves had
appropriate incentives to move the case along. As things now stand,
however, those incentives may not exist. What has gone wrong, and what
could be changed?
From the point of view of the debtor, perhaps the biggest, single
enticement to stall is the fact that interest does not have to be paid during
the pendency of the case. 278 This gives the debtor an enormous competi-

"appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other
interests of the estate."
276. S. REp. No. 168, supra note 64, at 40.
277. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 376
(1988).
278. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) disallows a claim for interest that is unmatured at the time
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tive advantage vis-4-vis its competitors.279 It enables the debtor to hold up
its creditors for a better deal in the plan. Combined with the virtually
unshakable retention of exclusivity, the debtor can simply refuse to go
forward until the creditors acquiesce in the debtor's plan, with the teeth
behind the debtor's bluff being the deprivation of interest. Time is money,
except in bankruptcy, and debtors are able to use that fact to their advantage. If the debtor had to pay interest during the case, that fact alone might
(1) decrease the number of Chapter 11 filings, perhaps dramatically, and (2)
discipline the debtor, in cases where it did file, to move expeditiously
toward confirmation. 8 °
So why not require debtors to pay pendency interest? The concern is
that imposing such a requirement would kill off many marginal cases before
they had a chance to get going. This result would frustrate the congressional
policy favoring reorganizations. One reason many debtors end up filing
Chapter 11 is that they are cash poor and cannot service their debt. While
in some cases the debtor is able to negotiate a voluntary suspension of
interest payments, the bank is not forced to agree to such a suspension. If
the bank does not agree, and the debtor lacks the money to make the
payments, what happens? It would do those debtors little good to permit
them to file Chapter 11 but then to require them to do the impossible and
pay the debt service they cannot pay. The theoretical benefits of Chapter 11
discussed at the start of this paper would be available only at the whim of
the debtor's bank. To date, reorganization policy makers have been
unwilling to grant such a veto power to secured lenders. In light of the
language quoted earlier in the 1977 House Report, 23 ' it is unlikely that
Congress will be inclined to change its stance on this issue.
To be sure, persuasive advocates have urged that the reorganization
should not be attempted at the expense of secured creditors, who, they
claim, do not really have a stake in the outcome. Professors Baird and
Jackson are the primary proponents of this view. 2" If the residual claimants, be they equity or unsecured creditors, want to attempt a reorganization, then those claimants should have to bear the real cost of doing so. If
they are not forced to pay, then, the argument goes, assets will be deployed
inefficiently. Furthermore, a wealth transfer from senior claimants to

the case is commenced.
279. See Greenwald, supra note 16, at 60.
280. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 49.
281. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supranote 2, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6179.
282. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizationsand the
Treatment ofDiverse OwnershipInterests:A Comment on Adequate ProtectionofSecured
Creditorsin Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984).
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residual claimants will occur, a result not necessary to the collective action
justification of bankruptcy relief.
The Supreme Court in Timbers rejected the Baird and Jackson argument
in the context of an undersecured creditor. Thus, after Timbers, any
requirement that the debtor pay interest during the case would require an
amendment to the Code. The Court did not really focus on the broader
issues of the normative bases for a reorganization policy, but limited its
discussion more to an interpretation of the various Bankruptcy Code
provisions.
The Baird and Jackson view adopts a limited perspective on the function
of Chapter 11 proceedings. To them, the only thing that should matter is
maximization of asset value.2 3 Other commentators, such as Professor
Elizabeth Warren, suggest that Congress had a broader public interest in
mind when it enacted the reorganization provisions, and that such an
orientation is proper.2 In keeping with this attitude, forcing some
creditors to take a hit in the form of foregone interest payments is justifiable
on a public interest basis.
At this point in time, however, it may be plausible to suggest that the
argument in favor of forcing debtors to pay interest may be supportable even
if a broader public interest focus is taken. The high failure rate of Chapter
11 cases and the long delays in Chapter 11 do more than hurt individual
creditors. They subvert the very public interest supposedly to be served.
Large deadweight losses help no one. Compelling debtors to pay interest
might serve the function of ferreting out the more viable debtors from those
who really have no realistic hope of survival. In addition, debtors would
then have an incentive to speed their case along.
I recognize that the pro-reorganization sentiment and the perception that
many debtors probably could not pay interest right away would probably
doom the chances that a provision requiring interest to be paid from day one
would pass. 2" A compromise might be possible, however, which would
allow debtors some breathing room and a chance to get back on their feet,
and yet, at the same time, light a fire under debtors to proceed apace. That
compromise would be for an interest moratorium to be imposed for some
defined period of time-120 days, six months, one year-but then for the
interest obligation to resume on a current basis when the moratorium period
expired.286 Perhaps the moratorium period could be coordinated with the
283. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 210; Baird, World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 5,
at 183-84.
284. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 8, at 787-88.
285. The National Bankruptcy Conference has not been able to reach consensus on the
question and notes that such a requirement would be "extremely controversial."
Statement of Position of NBC on S. 540, supra note 210, at 28.
286. An analogous proposal is made in S. 540 in the specific context of stay relief in
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exclusivity period and a feasibility finding. If one were really adamant that
no reallocative effects should occur, the interest could also accrue during the
moratorium period, with payment deferred to the plan. Requiring accrual
would be even more compelling in the event the debtor were found to be
solvent.
H. Reduce Number of Committees and Their Fees and Expenses
It would be a mistake to lay all the fault for the delays and expense of
Chapter 11 at the feet of debtors, however. Sharing the blame is the current
committee system.28 7 Once committees proliferate, bargaining becomes
more difficult. Also, if the fees of committee professionals and the expenses
of committee members are freely paid, then those groups have little
incentive to bring the case to a rapid conclusion. The counter-argument is
that vigorous committee participation is vital to the effective operation of a
Chapter 11 case.
One thing that bankruptcy courts can do is to resist the demand to
appoint multiple committees within a single case. 2 8 A big question here
is whether an equity committee should routinely be appointed. Professors
LoPucki and Whitford have shown that when an equity committee is
appointed, the chances that equity will receive something in the plan goes
up markedly. 2 9 This may or may not be viewed as a problem. However,
when an equity committee is in place, the bargaining process is made more
complicated and can be drawn out, thereby costing time and money.
Within the creditor ranks, courts also can resist the temptation to
appoint multiple committees. 2' The savings would be in fees and in
reducing bargaining costs. The downside, of course, is that a particular
group may be underrepresented. Adequate representation might be achieved
within the confines of the official committee, by placing enough representatives of different groups on the committee.

single-asset real estate cases. The suggested amendment would require interest to be paid
to the secured creditor in a single-asset real estate case beginning 90 days after the filing
of the case, unless the court ordered otherwise for cause. S. 540, Reported Version,
supra note 64, § 202(b)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B)). The proposal
made in the text here would be of general applicability to all Chapter 11 cases, not just
those involving single-asset real estate, and also would not be limited to the automatic
stay context.
287. See Jost, supra note 16, at 32; Rosen, supra note 14, at 48.
288. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1988), the court on request of a party in interest
may order the appointment of additional committees "if necessary to assure adequate
representation" of creditors or equity holders.
289. LoPucki & Whitford, Equity's Share, supra note 9, at 159.
290. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 48.
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Even if multiple committees are appointed, savings might be realized
by authorizing the committees to share professionals. 91 Much of the work
of committee professionals overlaps. In many cases, the work of professionals, such as accountants and investment bankers, could be shared by
different committees. Whether attorneys could be shared is a difficult
question. The attorney is an advocate for the group he or she represents. If
the initial appointment of the committee was justified because of a diversity
in interests between creditors or interest holders, then one could argue that
an attorney could not represent the diverse groups without running into
impossible conflicts of interest."9 Perhaps the committees could be given
the power to waive the conflict in advance.
The same problem occurs in multiple cases involving affiliated debtors.
The language of the Code293 and the practice of most courts require
separate committees and separate professionals for each case. In some
instances, as where cross-corporate claims may exist, actual or potential
conflicts of interest may make the multiple committee and professional
approach necessary. At the same time, it may be advisable to amend the
Code to give the court the power to merge committees or permit the sharing
of professionals in related cases, when the prospect for conflicts of interest
is less apparent.
This does not speak to the question of fees. The problem of professional
fees in general will be discussed in the next subpart. In the committee
context, one thought is whether the fees of the professionals should
automatically be paid by the bankruptcy estate, as they currently are.294
Perhaps the "substantial contribution" rule of section 503(b)(3) and (4)
should be extended to official committees as well.295 This concern pertains
especially with regard to committees that represent out-of-the-money
291. See id.
292. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b) provides that a professional employed by a committee "may
not represent any other entity having an adverse interest in connection with the case."
293. Id. § 1102(a)(1) ("shall appoint a committee"); id. § 1103(a) ("such committee"
may hire professionals); see H.R. REP,. No. 595, supra note 2, at 235, reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6195 ("There will be at least one committee in each case.").
294. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) allows as a first priority administrative expense payable
out of the bankruptcy estate "compensation and reimbursement awarded under section
330(a)." In turn, 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) permits compensation for fees and reimbursement
of expenses "to a professional person employed under section 1103." The employment
of professionals by committees, finally, is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
295. See Whitman, supra note 10, at 856-58. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) authorizes the
court to allow as an administrative expense the actual, necessary expenses incurred by
a creditor or an unofficial committee "in making a substantial contribution" to the
Chapter 11 case. Official committees are, however, expressly excluded from § 503(b)(3).
Compensation for professionals of an entity that qualifies for priority under § 503(b)(3)
may be allowed by the court under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4).
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constituencies.2 96 If those groups had to pay for their counsel out of their
own pockets, they might take a more considered posture in the case. If they
make a positive contribution to the case, administrative priority may be
obtained under section 503(b)(3) and (4). As things now stand, however,
underwater committees have every incentive to stall the case: their counsel
is free to them, and, if they wait long enough, either the debtor's finances
may improve so that they come into the money, or senior claimants may
throw them a bone to get them to go away.
Of course, it might be difficult to ascertain which groups are in, and
which are out of, the money. Thus, a rule premised on that distinction might
be difficult and costly to apply. The uncertainty also might have a chilling
effect on committee involvement in the case. To the extent that committees
took a less active posture, debtor control over the case would increase.
The only legislative steps taken in this area would call for more
expenses for committee work, not less. All of the reform bills in the 102d
and 103d Congress would amend section 503(b) to allow administrative
priority for the actual and necessary expenses of committee members. 2 7
The intent is to clarify existing law and to encourage the full and active
participation of committees. The idea that fees and expenses of committees
should be restricted, not expanded, has not been seriously considered by
Congress. The experience of leading practitioners suggests that this avenue
could be profitably explored more closely.
L Reduce ProfessionalFees
One means of reducing costs that has been explored in great detail is
cutting down on the allowance of professional fees.298 Senator

296. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 48-49.
297. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 111 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
503(b)(7)). The same proposal was made in the 1992 legislation. S. 1985, FinalVersion,
supra note 63, § 113 (to be codified at II U.S.C. § 503(b)(7)).
298. To illustrate, an entire issue of the American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review
(vol. 1, number 2, Winter 1993), was devoted to the topic Paying the Piper:Rethinking
Professional Compensation in Bankruptcy. Some of the articles include: The Costs of
Bankruptcy:A RoundtableDiscussion; Jay L. Westbrook, Fees andInherent Conflicts of
Interest, 1AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287 (1993); Hon. Alexander L. Paskay & Frances
P. Wolstenhome, Chapter11: A Growing Cash Cow-Some Thoughts on How to Rein
in the System, 1 AM. BANKR,. INST. L. REV. 331 (1993); Martin J. Whitman & David
M. Barse, ProfessionalsPaidby Debtors Ought to Represent the Debtors'Interests,1
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 367 (1993); Hon. Roger M. Whelan et al., Professional
CompensationReform:: New Ideas or Old Failings?, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. Rv. 407
(1993); Note, Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. Rv. 449
(1993); Gregory W. Bachman, Note, ProfessionalFees in Bankruptcy: Tailoring the
Johnson Factors to Suit Bankruptcy, 1 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 453 (1993); Gerard
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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Metzenbaum has done his best to make professional fees in Chapter 11 cases
a cause celebre.

99

The populist sentiment of the day is that some of the

only groups to benefit from Chapter 11 are the lawyers and accountants who
earn big fees in reorganization cases." ° Both Congress 3 1 and the popular press 3° like to call attention to cases like LTV, where attorneys' fees
have surpassed $100 million. In many instances, however, Professor Warner
may be accurate in observing that "conclusions are frequently reached, court
decisions rendered and laws enacted on the3 3 basis of little more than
individual perceptions and visceral reactions.
There is no question that large attorneys' fees create problems, both as
a matter of public perception about the integrity of the bankruptcy
system3' and as a burden on the reorganization case itself. The reform
Di Conza, Note, ProfessionalFees in Bankruptcy: The Use of the Lodestar, 1 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 463 (1993); Christine Jagde & Mamie Stathatos, Note,
Professional Fees in Bankruptcy: Percentage-of-the-Recovery Method-A "Solvent"
Response for Bankruptcy Proceedings?,1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 471 (1993).

A very comprehensive and useful study of the entire topic is found in AMERICAN
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, NATIONAL REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION IN

BANKRUPTCY CASES (G.R. Warner rep. 1991) [hereinafter REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL
COMPENSATION].

299. For a sample of Senator Metzenbaum's salvos fired at bankruptcy attorneys, see
138 CONG. REC. S8340-41 (daily ed. June 17, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).

The sponsor of the 1992 reform legislation noted that the provision on attorneys' fees
was included at the suggestion of Senator Metzenbaum, "who has been at the forefront
of this question." 138 CONG. REc. S8253 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (remarks of Sen.
Heflin); see Jost, supra note 16, at 32.
300. To illustrate the breadth of the opprobrium heaped on lawyers in bankruptcy
cases, even Senator Dole, not exactly the arch-populist of the Senate, stated:
The committee hearing held on the issue of professional fees in bankruptcy
cases indicated that there is a lot of abuse out there. Cases were found which
showed forum shopping to locate cases in jurisdictions where fees are less
carefully scrutinized by the court [author's note: Greyhound, no doubt!]....
I suspect that all this is just the tip of the iceberg ....
[T]he current state of
affairs nonetheless leads many creditors caught up in the bankruptcy system
to legitimately wonder who the system is working for. Indeed, what is the
point of a bankruptcy system that enriches the professionals and leaves the
creditors holding the bag.
138 CONG. REc. S8280 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
301. 138 CONG. REc. S8340 (daily ed. June 17, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum)
(drawing attention in particular to the interesting billing category of "passive travel, a
term the firm used to refer to the time lawyers spent sleeping or reading a magazine
while on a plane en route to a bankruptcy meeting").
302. See Greenwald, supra note 16, at 61; Henwood, supra note 16, at 360; Passell,
supra note 16, at C9; Wechsler, Money to Burn?, supra note 16, at 72.
303. REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL

COMPENSATION,

supra note 298, at 1.

304. Senator Grassley quoted from a speech given by Chief Justice Rehnquist to the
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legislation being considered would amend section 330 of the Code to
provide for very detailed guidelines for courts to consider in setting
fees.3 5 Factors to be considered would include:
(I) the time spent on such services; (II) the rates charged for such
services; (III) whether the services were necessary in the administration of or beneficial toward the completion of a case under this
title; and (IV) the total value of the estate and the amount of funds
or other property available for distribution to all creditors both
secured and unsecured. 0 6
The stated purpose of these specific guidelines is to force courts to scrutinize
fee applications very carefully; the real purpose probably is to cut fee
allowances.
I am not confident that adopting more particularized guidelines for fees
will accomplish much good."° Depending on how the guidelines are
interpreted, that approach might result in only a very modest nibbling away
at fees allowed-and at considerable expense in terms of judicial time and
effort to review massive fee applications. It is a myth to suggest that courts
are not already closely policing bankruptcy fees; they are.3" 8
Two things might make a difference. One would be for Congress to
retreat from its basic position rejecting the principle of economy that
prevailed under the Act.3 9 It has been suggested that the proposed
amendment might do just that.310 The other would be for courts to give
effect that large attorneys' fees "have become a potent source for controversy when
combined with the increasing criticism that lawyers' and experts' fees often swallow up
large portions of an estate's assets, leaving little behind for creditors." 138 CONG. REC.
S8254 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Grassley) (quoting Chief Justice
Rehnquist).

305. S. 540, Reported Version, supra note 64, § 309 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
330(a)).

306. Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(A)(ii)).
307. The National Bankruptcy Conference announced unanimous opposition to the
proposal in S.540 to amend § 330(a). Statement of Position of NBC on S. 540, supra
note 210, at 53.

308. Fees in bankruptcy cases may already be lower than in other areas of practice.
REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION, supra note 298, at 3. Professor Warner
found "a high level of vigilance" in policing professional fees. Id.
309. See 124 CONG. Rc. H11,091-92 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) ("Notions of
economy of the estate in fixing fees are outdated and have no place in a bankruptcy
code."); 124 CONG. REC.S17,408 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (same); H.R. REP. No. 595,

supra note 2, at 329-30, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6286 ("The effect ... is
to overrule ...cases that require fees to be determined based on notions of conservation
of the estate and economy of administration.").
310. Whelan et al., supra note 298, at 407; ABI LEGIS. BULL. (Am. Bankr. Inst.,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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greater emphasis to factors IV and III above, in that order, and less to hours
(I) and rates (II). As long as time expended multiplied by hourly rates
remains the baseline, bankruptcy fees will remain very high, and yet
positive results might not be forthcoming. Comparable fees in nonbankruptcy cases are very high, and big Chapter 11 cases take a lot of time.
If, however, courts shake the "time is money" mentality and look at what
is left in the estate, and what the lawyers did to bring that about, more
significant changes could be possible. For example, if only $5 million is left
at the end of the case to distribute to creditors, a court would be justified in
denying attorney's fees of $4 million, computed on an "hours times rate"
basis.
If lawyers knew that they would ultimately be answerable (in terms of
their fees allowed) for the value of the estate, and that their recovery would
be based on a percentage of the estate, several positive things might
happen3 ' (apart from the simple disallowance of large fees). If the case
did not look promising, lawyers would not be inclined to pour a lot of time
into that case in a probably vain attempt to reorganize. This could lead to
quicker termination of doubtful cases. Furthermore, even more promising
cases might be concluded more quickly, with less delay in negotiations. The
lawyers would know that they would not necessarily be compensated for
every hour spent, and thus would have no reason to churn hours. The moral
hazard inherent in a pay-by-the-hour system would largely be obviated.
The counterargument is that all that would be accomplished by
restricting attorneys' fees is that qualified lawyers would shun the bankruptcy arena and move to more profitable areas of practice. 1 2 This in turn
would hamper the smooth operation of the complex bankruptcy system.
Admittedly, there is at least some truth in this line of argument. But, it must
be balanced against the inequities prevalent under the currently prevailing
system.
It is always politically easy to pick on lawyers. It happens from both
sides of the aisle. So, any bankruptcy reform bill that is passed in the near
future is likely to have a similar fee provision. Lawyers, beware.
J. Absolute Priority and New Value: What to Do?
One of the hottest topics in the bankruptcy field today is the status and

operation

of

the

absolute

priority

rule31 3

and

the

new-value

Washington, D.C.), Sept. 20, 1993.
311. The "percentage-of-recovery" method of calculating fees is espoused in Jagde &
Stathatos, supra note 298, at 471-77.
312. See S. REP. No. 279, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1992) (additional views of Sen.
DeConcini); Whelan et al., supra note 298, at 408.
313. This rule only allows junior claimants to participate in a reorganization if senior
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"exception. "314 Much has been written; it is not my intention to reinvent
the wheel and join full force in that debate. My perspective is rather on how
the absolute priority rule impacts on the Chapter 11 process, and what
changes might be made that could improve the overall operation of Chapter
11.

One of the critical congressional decisions in 1978 was to apply the
absolute priority rule only in a cramdown plan." 5 The rigid adherence to
the rule required in Chapter X was abandoned. The need for a full-scale
valuation of the debtor's business was felt to be wasteful and costly, besides
being very uncertain." 6 Thus, Congress decided to permit senior claimants
to agree to give up value to junior claimants, in order to avoid the high
costs of litigating valuation, and "to expedite or insure the success of the
reorganization." 317 In a consensual plan, only the best-interests test,
which insures each claimant at least liquidation value, applies. 8
Studies have shown that absolute priority is routinely violated in
Chapter 11 cases.31 But one may ask, so what? The concern is that equity
holders, even when their class is clearly underwater, can disrupt and delay
plan negotiations by demanding a share of the reorganization pie as the price
of avoiding a valuation hearing. Creditor interests have no effective means
of making these equity nuisances go away, except to pay them off.320

claimants are paid in full. Under the Code, this rule only operates if a class dissents,
forcing cram down under § 1129(b). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B), (C) (1988). Furthermore, the rule only operates from the dissenting class down, meaning that senior classes
still remain free to give up value to each other, as long as no class receives more than
full payment.
314. The "new value" exception allows equity holders to retain (obtain?) an ownership
interest in the reorganized debtor even if their class is under water, based on a
contribution of new value to the reorganized entity. This participation is justified as being
allowed on account of the new money, not the old equity interest.
315. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b); see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 224, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6184 ("Only when the parties are unable to agree on a proper
distribution of the value of the company does the bill establish a financial standard....
The rule is a partial application of the absolute priority rule .... ").
316. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 222, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6181 (stating that "the length and uncertainty of the valuation process is no longer
justified in every case"; also, quoting Peter Coogan's observation that "such a valuation
is usually 'a guess compounded by an estimate"').
317. See id. at 224, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6184.
318. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7); see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 224, 412,
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6183-84, 6368.
319. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 10, at 7; LoPucki & Whitford, Equity's Share,
supra note 9, at 142-43; LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 9,
at 626-27; Weiss, supra note 48, at 294.
320. See LoPucki & Whitford, Equity's Share, supra note 9, at 143-58; LoPucki &
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/6
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One solution that has been proposed by LoPucki and Whitford is for the
bankruptcy court to enter a "preemptive cram down" order early in the case
to extinguish the interests of clearly insolvent equity or even junior debt
" ' This would have several beneficial effects, they
classes. 32
claim, without
impairing any substantive rights of the affected classes. The extinguished
classes would no longer be parties in interest in the Chapter 11 case, and
thus would not be entitled to participate in plan negotiations or appear and
object at hearings. Nor would those classes be entitled to organize
committees and hire professionals at the expense of the bankruptcy
estate. 3z2
LoPucki and Whitford are careful to point out that entry of a preemptive cram-down order would not prevent senior creditors from permitting
extinguished equity holders to share in the plan.3" They may want to do
so to keep the expertise of particular managers, or to help create a market
for the securities of the reorganized company. The new-value exception
would not be affected, because it is not based on the old equity claim, but
on a new contribution of value.324
The proposal suggested by LoPucki and Whitford has substantial merit,
and should be carefully considered. As they point out, equity holders would
not be deprived of any substantive right, for creditors still can insist on the
application of the absolute priority rule. All that would happen is that the
delays and expenses caused by obstructionist equity tactics could be readily
eliminated by entry of a preemptive cram-down order.
What to do with the controversy over the new-value exception is
another matter. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case of In
re Bonner Mall Partnership,325 in which the Ninth Circuit held that the
new-value exception survived the enactment of the Code. Certainty here
would be worth a lot.326 Litigation over uncertainty and bargaining in the
shadow of unclear legal rules create significant costs. Once those uncertainty
costs are eliminated, however, I do not think that it makes much difference
for Chapter 11 practice whether the exception exists or not. If no new-value
exception were permitted, then creditors would have a yet stronger case for
controlling the outcome of single-asset cases. The ultimate outcome as
between debtor and creditor, however, is less important for my purposes

Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 9, at 628-32.
321. LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 9, at 633-35.

322. Id. at 634-35.
323. Id. at 635.
324. Id. at 644-46.
325. Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall
Partnership), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994).
326. See Rhodes, supra note 233, at 290.
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here than are the systemic effects of the rule.
K. Make PrepackagedPlans Easierto Confirm
One device that has become more popular in the 1980s and 1990s is the
prepackaged plan, or "pre-pack. "327 In a pre-pack, the terms of the plan
are agreed to, and the acceptances are solicited and obtained, prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy case. A Chapter 11 case is then filed in order to
confirm the previously agreed-to plan and thereby bind dissenting creditors
to the plan's terms. The previously obtained acceptances are used in the
Chapter 11 plan confirmation process. The big advantage of a pre-pack is
that the case can be in and out of bankruptcy court very quickly, and thus
the costs of the proceeding are correspondingly low.
Pre-packs have been used most often in cases where the business itself
is sound, but the capital structure of the debtor needs to be revised. A
common example is when the debtor was the subject of a leveraged buyout
and now needs to revise its obligations to its junk bond holders.328 What
happens is that an exchange offer is made to the bondholders outside of
bankruptcy, with the instruction that acceptances may be used in a Chapter
11 case.
The Bankruptcy Code and Rules currently permit prepackaged plans.
Section 1126(b) states that the prepetition acceptances may be used if the
solicitation complied with any applicable nonbankruptcy disclosure rules329
(e.g., the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), or, if none, after disclosure that
meets the adequate information test of Bankruptcy Code section
1125(a). 330 Rule 3018(b) requires the transmission of the plan to substantially all members of the same class (but not all members of all classes), and
33
that the time given for acceptance not be "an unreasonably short time."
The Southland case exposed some problems with the legal rules
governing pre-packs.332 Those problems should be clarified, especially
given the prospect of even more pre-packs being filed in the aftermath of the
LBO craze of the 1980s. Pre-packs also may be a useful way to deal with

327. See Mark E. MacDonald & Arthur E. Stewart, Trend: PrepackagedBankruptcies
and LBOs, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at Al (Mar. 7, 1991); Patrick A. Murphy,
Prepackaging:Plans Can Succeed, Sometimes, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 19;
Weinstein, supra note 86, at 13.
328. See Murphy, supra note 327, at 25-26; Weinstein, supra note 86, at 13.
329. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b)(1) (1988).
330. Id. § 1126(b)(2).
331. FED. R. BANKa. P. 3018(b).

332. In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). For a discussion
of that case, see Claudia MacLachlan, PrepackagedBankruptcy Stumbles, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 28, 1991, at 1.
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single-asset real estate cases, of which there are many. In Southland Judge
Abramson overturned the use of prepetition acceptances for several reasons.
One was that the votes were obtained from record holders of the securities,
who are not necessarily the same as the beneficial holders.333 Second was
the finding that an unreasonably short time (eight business days) was given
for voting. 334 Finally, in dictum the judge noted the difficulties that a
debtor may face in trying to comply with the amorphous disclosure standard
of section 1126(b).
These problems could be dealt with in several ways. First, the
Bankruptcy Code could be amended to clarify that a vote by record holders
of securities is sufficient. Second, Rule 3018(b) could be amended to specify
an exact time period that must be given for returning votes. This would
enable debtors to know with certainty that they have satisfied the timing
problem; there does not appear to be any good reason to have an openended "unreasonably short time" test.
Finally, Congress may want to rethink the reference in section
1126(b)(1) to nonbankruptcy disclosure rules and may want to provide
debtors with some mechanism for obtaining prior approval of the disclosure
materials. If votes can be solicited in a Chapter 11 case without complying
with nonbankruptcy securities laws, but only with section 1125 of the
Bankruptcy Code, it would seem plausible to permit a debtor to do the same
when the votes solicited will be used to confirm a Chapter 11 plan, even
though the solicitation itself occurred prior to Chapter 11. Of course, if
Chapter 11 were not invoked, nonbankruptcy securities laws would have to
be followed in effecting an exchange offer. That fact might lead debtors to
go ahead and comply with the securities laws anyway, so that the exchange
offer will be valid without resorting to Chapter 11 if enough acceptances are
obtained.
Assuming that section 1126(b)(1) were repealed, and that only section
1125 disclosure would be required, efficiency still would be promoted if
debtors knew in advance of the solicitation that their disclosure was
adequate. Otherwise, as Judge Abramson noted in Southland, debtors are
playing "Russian Roulette" with the adequacy of prepetition disclosure.336
What I propose is permitting a presolicitation court approval of the
disclosure statement. The Code could be amended to permit the debtor to
file a declaratory judgment action as to the adequacy of the section 1125
disclosure in the bankruptcy court. If these changes are made, the confirmation of prepackaged plans would be simpler and more certain, which in turn

333. Southland, 124 B.R. at 220-25.
334. Id. at 227.
335. Id. at 225-26.

336. Id.
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might encourage greater use of the process.
L. FacilitateMajor-Asset Sales
Earlier in this Article, I rejected the view that Chapter 11 should be
repealed and replaced by a mandatory-auction system. It should be
emphasized, however, that my concerns focused on the mandatory aspect of
the proposal, not on the efficacy of auction sales. It is indisputable that, in
many instances, a sale is to be preferred to an internal reorganization with
a "hypothetical" sale to existing creditors and equity holders. A sale
establishes a precise and hopefully accurate value and can often be accomplished much more rapidly and inexpensively than a negotiated plan. An
actual sale neatly bifurcates the issues of how the assets should be deployed
and how the value of those assets should be distributed to claimants. My
concern simply was that these benefits of a sale are not realizable in every
case, and that a compulsory sale rule would be counterproductive in those
instances.
I do think that the Bankruptcy Code could be profitably amended by
facilitating major-asset sales under section 363(b)(1), 337 even if the
proposed sale covers all or substantially all of the debtor's assets. Under
current law the ability of a debtor to effectuate such a sale outside of a
confirmed plan is somewhat uncertain and is definitely limited. The
controlling presumption is that a sale of substantially all assets should only
take place in a confirmed Chapter 11 plan or in a Chapter 7 case. In the
Chapter 11 setting, the theory is that creditors and equity holders should not
be deprived of the rights provided to them in the plan confirmation process,
especially disclosure under section 1125 and voting under section 1126. In
a Chapter 7 case, an independent disinterested trustee runs the sale,
supposedly protecting interested parties and ensuring fairness.
Courts in Chapter 11 have developed a variety of tests to gauge whether
a substantial asset sale should be approved outside of the confirmation
process. The leading case is Lionel,33 in which the Second Circuit
demanded a "business justification" for the sale. The insistence of the
creditors' committee was held not to be a sufficient justification. The court
also enunciated a list of factors to be considered in deciding whether to
approve the sale.

337. All that 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988) says is that the trustee (or DIP, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1107(a)), after notice and a hearing, may sell property of the estate other than in the
ordinary course of business. No further limits are imposed. As the text explains,
however, courts have added restrictions.
338. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722
F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Other cases have taken a stricter view. For example, the White
Motor?39 court demanded a showing of emergency as a predicate to
approval of a pre-plan substantial-asset sale. Another concern is whether the
court will deny approval of the sale on the ground that the entire transaction
goes beyond a mere sale and effectively constitutes a sub rosa plan. The
4 is the leading case on that issue.
Fifth Circuit's decision in Branif&
I assert that the presumption against a pre-plan sale should be reversed.
Sales should be encouraged as much as possible. If the debtor wants to make
the sale, then unnecessary roadblocks should not be imposed. Certainly
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard should be given to all
interested parties of the proposed sale, in conjunction with Rules 2002341
and 6004.342 As long as those procedural hurdles are satisfied, however,
I see no reason why substantive objections should be raised beyond the
question of whether the price proposed is fair. This issue of course would
encompass not only valuation evidence, but also matters such as how the
property was marketed, whether any insiders have connections to the
purchaser, and so forth. Objecting parties could appear at the hearing and
present evidence as to why the sale was unfair, and the court could take
those objections under consideration. If the creditors' committee objected to
the sale, the court probably would ascribe great weight to their objection.
All in all, however, I fail to see the benefits of a creditor vote when an
actual market sale is being contemplated. No such vote occurs in Chapter
7 sales.
One concern that might be raised is that creditors and equity holders
would be deprived of a vote not only on the merits of the sale, but on the
fact of the sale itself. In other words, what if creditors or equity holders
want to keep the assets and attempt an internal reorganization, rather than
339. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
340. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways,
Inc.), 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).
341. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2) requires giving 20 days' advance notice by mail
of a proposed sale out of the ordinary course of business, but does give the court
flexibility for cause shown to shorten the time or direct another method for giving notice.
Rule 2002(c) elaborates on the content of the required notice, which must include the
time and place of any public sale, the terms and conditions of any private sale, and the
time fixed for filing objections. General descriptions of property are allowed. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2002(c).
342. Rule 6004 gives detailed procedural requirements, in addition to those specified
in Rule 2002, for non-ordinary course sales of property. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004
(1993). That rule covers the requirement of notice (Rule 6004(a)); the filing of objections
(Rule 6004(b)); sales free and clear of liens (Rule 6004(c)); sales of property under
$2500 (Rule 6004(d)); a hearing (Rule 6004(e)); and the conduct of the sale (Rule
6004(f)). One point of interest is that the rule only requires a hearing to be held if a
timely objection is filed. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(e).
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liquidate? A short answer is that creditors and equity holders do not have the
right to vote on a reorganization under the Code. Under section 1112(a) a
Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") has an absolute right to convert to
Chapter 7, except in circumstances not relevant here.343 While creditors
can move for a conversion back to Chapter 11, the granting of that request
is within the court's discretion. 3" That being said, then, it does not appear
that creditors have lost any rights if the court at the Chapter 11 sale hearing
weighs and determines arguments on the pros and cons of reorganization
versus liquidation. To insist on a conversion to Chapter 7 seems foolish.
Indeed, the bigger problem may be not a reluctance of creditors to
agree to a sale when the debtor's management wants to sell, but rather the
opposite-that creditors may want a sale while the debtor wants to force an
internal reorganization. Here the creditors will largely be stymied. Section
363(b)(1) only allows the "trustee" (or the DIP) 345 to sell property outside
of the ordinary course of business.346 Creditors have no authority to
propose such a sale. Creditorg could file a liquidating plan,347 but only if
the debtor's exclusive period has expired or been terminated,34 which, as
discussed above, rarely happens. The only apparent avenues of recourse are
for the creditors to seek to terminate exclusivity, either directly349 or
through the appointment of a trustee, 350 or to ask for a conversion to
Chapter 7 for cause under section 1112(b).351 In practice, these remedies
are rarely granted.
I would suggest giving creditors greater power to propose a substantialasset sale. This could be accomplished in various ways, but would require
some sensitivity to the normal processes of corporate governance. Section
363(b)(1) could be amended directly to extend the power to propose nonordinary-course sales to all parties in interest, rather than just the trustee or
DIP. The concern with this is that any crackpot could trigger litigation over
the propriety of a sale. The presence of such a provision might deter many

343. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1988). A debtor is not entitled to convert as of right if a
trustee has been appointed, id. § 1112(a)(1); the Chapter 11 case was originally
commenced as an involuntary case, id.§ 1112(a)(2); or the Chapter 11 case was

converted from another chapter other than on the debtor's request, id.
§ 11 12(a)(3).
344. Id.§ 1112(b) (court "may" convert or dismiss the case on request of a party in

interest).
345. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) gives the DIP all the rights and powers of the trustee.
346. Id.§ 363(b)(1).
347. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) allows liquidating plans.
348. Id.§ 1121(c).

349. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) the court may shorten the exclusive period for cause.
350. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1) exclusivity terminates automatically upon the
appointment of a trustee.
351. Id.§ 1112(b).
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debtors from ever filing Chapter 11 in the first place.
One way to address these concerns would be to restrict the power to
request a major-asset sale to an official section 1102 committee. The
likelihood of nuisance crackpot motions would be greatly diminished in that
event. Another possibility would be to allow any party in interest to make
the motion, but only after first obtaining court approval. An analogy to a
derivative suit could be made.
Another possible method of opening up access to the auction process
would be to limit exclusivity in some way. The merits of those suggestions
were addressed above. It may be possible, however, to have different
exclusivity rules depending on whether the non-debtor is proposing a
liquidating or non-liquidating plan. If a liquidating plan is being proposed,
then an earlier termination of exclusivity, for that limited purpose only,
might be considered.
Along these lines, a further option might be to require the court at some
defined point in time to consider the merits of an auction. Earlier I
considered the possible benefits of a threshold feasibility determination,
perhaps in conjunction with the 120-day exclusivity period. This feasibility
hearing might be expanded to consider explicitly the possibility of a sale of
the debtor's assets. In doing so the court should not indulge a presumption
against such a sale. Indeed, if the debtor has not filed a plan by the 120-day
period, it would be entirely appropriate for the court to operate on the
assumption that a sale should affirmatively be pursued, subject of course to
rebuttal by the debtor or other parties in interest. The U.S. Trustee could
even be charged with the responsibility of appointing an independent
investment banker to pursue the possibility of a sale. Nor should this
feasibility/sale hearing be a one-shot thing. If the debtor's exclusive period
is extended initially and the sale option blocked for the time being, a similar
inquiry should be made at the conclusion of the extended period.
One objection to the scheme I have proposed is that it would compel a
significant amount of unnecessary and wasteful litigation. Take, for
example, a hypothetical case in which a sale is entirely impractical and no
one seriously favors such a course of action. Why, in such a case, should
a hearing be conducted on the merits of a sale that no one wants? Furthermore, who would even present the case for such a sale?
The latter issue applies with equal force to feasibility hearings
generally. One possibility is to place responsibility for examining feasibility
and for pursuing the sale option in the U.S. Trustee's office. Those offices
today are probably too understaffed to adequately perform these additional
responsibilities, so would have to be given the money to hire more help.
Another possibility is to use the creditors' committee, which is already
charged with investigating whether the debtor's business should be
continued. That investigatory duty could be expanded to include a duty to
report on the advisability of a sale. A third possibility is to appoint in each
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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case an independent investigator or examiner to consider the merits of a
sale. The objection there would be the extra cost involved.
The concern with whether a hearing on a sale option should be
mandatory is potentially a serious one. Yet, I believe that it can be dealt
with. In an environment in which approximately ninety percent of all
Chapter 11 cases fail, it is not irresponsible to suggest that the parties may
not be omniscient. Whatever party is given the responsibility for considering
the sale option could be required to file a preliminary report advising on the
prospects of a sale. If the report indicated that a sale was not propitious at
the present time, and if no one objected to that report's conclusions, then the
sale part of the hearing could be handled quickly.
Another possible criticism is that the looming presence of the sale
option might inhibit negotiations for an internal plan. That may well be true.
However, I believe that if meaningful and promising negotiations are going
forward, a court could easily find that a sale presently is not warranted. If
creditors as a group feel so strongly about the benefits of a sale, as opposed
to an internal reorganization, that they stonewall plan negotiations, then that
may be a significant indicator that a sale should be seriously considered.
This leads to a concern that debtors may lose control over the course
of a reorganization. If that prospect is serious enough, it may even chill the
willingness of debtors to file for Chapter 11 in the first place. My response
is that Congress never intended for debtors to have the almost absolute
control over a Chapter 11 case that they now generally enjoy in practice.
Earlier I talked about how exclusivity practice has largely frustrated the
congressional intent that debtors and creditors should share a balance of
power in a Chapter 11 proceeding. My proposal would help to restore a
proper balance of power. Creditors still would have to convince the court
that a sale is a good idea; they would not have plenary power to implement
such a course.
M. Appoint Trustee or Examiner
Another reform idea that has been floated is to appoint either a trustee
3 52
or an examiner in every case, or to pursue some lesser variant thereof
Possible variants might include only making the appointment for publicly
held debtors, or for debtors with a certain amount of debt, or only after the
passage of a certain amount of time, and so forth. Obviously the seeds of
this idea derive from the old practice under Chapter X, in which a trustee
was appointed in every case with over $250,000 in contingent, liquidated
indebtedness.153 In thinking about the wisdom of mandatory trustees or

352. See Jones, supra note 5, at 1092.
353. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 156, 92 Stat. 840, 888 (1938) (repealed 1978).
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examiners, we again therefore are obligated to consider (1) why Chapter X
initially was set up to provide for independent trustees in every case, and (2)
why the Chapter X practice was abandoned in 1978; and then to assess the
extent to which those reasons either are or are not still persuasive today.
A primary theme running throughout Chapter X was the perceived need
to protect the public investor from the machinations of corporate insiders,
who supposedly were reorganizing companies in cahoots with friendly bank
creditors to the detriment of the "little guy."'" The foundational document
reaching this conclusion and driving the enactment of Chapter X was the
Protective Committee Report,355 published in eight parts from 1937 to
1940 under the supervision of William Douglas until his appointment to the
Supreme Court. Essentially, this report concluded that many reorganizations
of public companies were little more than "set-up" jobs in which the public
investor got shortchanged. The medicines needed to cure this ill were first,
the appointment of a disinterested trustee in every case; second, an active
supervisory role for the SEC; and third, a rigid application of the absolute
priority rule.356 None of these protections was carried over into Chapter

XI, where they were seen as unnecessary.
By the time of the reforms of the 1970s, many observers felt that
Chapter X had outlived its usefulness, for a variety of reasons. One was the
perception that the financial world Douglas that looked at in the 1930s no
longer existed357 (indeed, some of his contemporary critics suggested that

it did not exist then, either).358 For example, by the 1970s the public
investor more often than not did not hold senior debt, but subordinated debt
or equity. Thus, a strict absolute priority rule harmed these investors more
than it hurt them.359 Furthermore, the abuses of the 1930s now rarely
occurred, given the pervasive impact of the securities laws and the powerful
role of the SEC generally.3 " The need for protection of public investorv
by always appointing a trustee no longer seemed as compelling.

354. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 249-51.
355. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, ptS. I-VIn (1937-1940).

356. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 243-45.

357. See 124 CONG. REC. H11,101 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC.
S17,417 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 222, 232-33,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6182, 6192.

358. See Robert Swaine, "Democratization"of CorporateReorganizations,38 COLUM.
L. REV. 256, 257-58 (1938), quoted in COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at
24243.

359. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 222, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6182.
360. See id. at 232-33, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6192.
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Indeed, automatic appointment of a trustee was viewed instead as
imposing serious costs. The primary costs contemplated were (1) the direct
expense of an independent trustee and (2) the indirect expense stemming
from the displacement of existing management and the need for the new
trustee to familiarize himself with the debtor's business.36' A further
negative consequence of the mandatory-trustee rule was the fact that debtors
would mightily resist filing under Chapter X, where they would be
replaced. 62 This of course led to widespread attempts to reorganize public
companies in Chapter XI, which in turn led to enormous amounts of
litigation over the chapter choice, and the deprivation for public investors
of the protections of Chapter X in the vast majority of cases. 63
Interestingly, the determination to ditch the Chapter X approach was
not the product of an overwhelming consensus. Indeed, the result reached
in the 1978 Code in section 11043" was arrived at almost grudgingly,
after several modest interim steps. The 1973 Commission Report recommended, in conjunction with its proposed merger of Chapters X and XI,
abolition of the mandatory trustee. 316 That was done, however, largely
because of (1) a recognition that in the context of a single reorganization
chapter there would be some debtors, especially those that are closely held,
for whom appointment of a trustee would be foolish; and (2) the burden of
operating the business in some cases would be an unwarranted one for the
trustee, when the only real need was for an investigation of the debtor.3"
Yet, the Commission remained adamant that "an independent trustee is often
desirable, especially in a case involving the reorganization of a corporate
debtor having substantial indebtedness and publicly held securities." 367 As
a result, the Commission suggested that "the need for appointment be
presumptive where indebtedness exceeds $1,000,000 and there are 300 or
more security holders."368 Furthermore, the Commission scheme contemplated the creation of an independent, watchdog administrative agency to
police the bankruptcy process, which could recommend to the court the need
for a trustee.36 9 The door was cracked open, however, by the introduction
of an element of discretion vested in the bankruptcy judge as to whether to
appoint a trustee.

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

See id. at 233, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6192.
See id. at 233-34, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6193.
See id. at 223, 232-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6182, 6193.
11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 74, pt. 1, at 253.
Id.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
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By 1978, however, the opening in the door had been pushed a bit
wider. The Senate had favored the mandatory appointment of a trustee in
"public" cases, defined as ones in which the debtor had $5 million in debts
and 1000 security holders.3 70 The House preferred a purely discretionary
approach. 3 71 However, the 1977 House Report still contemplated the
existence of a national, independent U.S. Trustee system and postulated that
the U.S. Trustee could help advise the court as to which cases were
appropriate candidates for trustees. The 1978 Code itself adopted the House
approach of making trustee appointment discretionary.3 72 However, the
U.S. Trustee system was made only a pilot program in a few districts.
The remnant of the public debtor approach was the requirement in
section 1104(b)(2)-apparently mandatory 373-that an examiner, rather
than a trustee, be appointed in all cases with $5 million in unsecured
debts.374 The motivation for this change in part was the idea that the most
important reason a trustee was needed was to investigate the debtor, which
an examiner could do as well. An examiner, however, unlike a trustee,
would not be saddled with the additional burden of having to operate the
business.37 It seemed the best of both worlds.
The 1978 blueprint has not been followed. Under the Code, trustees are
almost never appointed. Although section 1104(a) is not a dead letter, it is
not far from it. Courts announce and apply a very strong presumption
against the appointment of a trustee. The norm is that the debtor continues
in possession. This, I submit, is a perversion of what virtually everyone
involved in the 1970s reforms intended. Even the mandatory-examiner
provision is routinely ignored by courts. It may be that the pendulum has
swung too far. The question today is whether to swing it back, and if so,
how far.
In thinking about this issue, it is worth highlighting some of the reasons
why the mandatory trustee idea has resurfaced. Some are legitimate; others
are less so. One of the popular indictments levied against Chapter 11 today

370. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1978), reprinted in 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5901.
371. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 234, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6193-94.
372. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
373. Id. § 1104(b) ("court shall order the appointment of an examiner"); see 124
CONG. REc. H1l,100 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) ("In order to insure that adequate
investigation of the debtor is conducted to determine fraud or wrongdoing on the part of
present management, an examiner is requiredto be appointed in all cases in which the
debtor's fixed, liquidated, and unsecured debts ... exceed $5 million"); 124 CONG.
REC. S17,417 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (same).
374. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2).
375. See COMMISSION

REPORT,

supra note 74, pt. 1, at 253.
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is that debtors' management are using it to feather their own nests. Indeed,
one of the central conclusions of the Bradley and Rosenzweig article was
that debtor management was one of the only beneficiaries of Chapter 11
today.376 The case for appointing a trustee then would be (although
Bradley & Rosenzweig do not make this assertion, because they think the
better approach is just to repeal Chapter 11 outright) that Chapter 11 would
not be invoked as a strategic device by debtors' managers who knew that
they would thereby be putting themselves out of a job.
Furthermore, the assertion is made that this foreknowledge would have
a chastening effect on the business practices and strategies of debtor
companies. Another of the charges made against Chapter 11 is that it creates
perverse investment incentives, in that debtors can pursue highly risky
business strategies, confident that if the risk does not pay off, Chapter 11
will provide a soft and safe landing. Thus, Bradley and Rosenzweig argue
that Chapter 11 is more endogenous than had previously been thought, in
the sense that the reasons why debtors end up in Chapter 11 often are very
much in the control of the debtor up front.377 Without Chapter 11, they
argue, debtors would have to make business planning decisions even up,
without the Chapter 11 hedge. Just the same, the argument can be made that
managers who know they will lose control of the company if it ends up in
Chapter 11 would elect up front to pursue more cautious and prudent
business plans.
One of the major problems with this argument is that it ignores the
facts. The evidence shows that most chief executives of a company that ends
up in Chapter 11 lose their job as a consequence, either shortly before the
filing or relatively soon thereafter.378 This evidence belies the assertion
that Chapter 11 does in fact provide a safe haven for a debtor's top
managers. Thus, either debtors' management are systematically ignorant of
this phenomenon, or Bradley and Rosenzweig and others are wrong.
Having said that, there is no doubt that Chapter 11 often is used for
somewhat questionable reasons. How questionable depends in part on one's
political as well as business philosophy, but most observers concede that
many debtors do push Chapter 11 to the limits. It is a fair suggestion that

376. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1088.
377. Id. at 1047-48.
378. Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 355, 356 (1990); Stuart C. Gilson, ManagementTurnover andFinancialDistress,
25 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 246-48 (1989); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance,
supranote 9, at 723-37; LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 9, at 105; see Henwood,
supranote 16, at 363; Go Bust, supra note 16, at 63; ProfessorLynn LoPucki: Bradley

& Rosenzweig Were Wrong, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR), at A5 (Oct. 29, 1992); The
NCBJ Debate:Elizabeth Warren vs. Bradley &Rosenzweig, 23 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR),
at A7 (Oct. 29, 1992).
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such strategic usage of Chapter 11 would be reduced, at least somewhat, if
the debtor's management believed that they would be displaced, or even that
they plausibly might be displaced. I believe that the top management of most
companies that file for Chapter 11 do not believe that they will be replaced
by a trustee. If they did think that would happen, they would perhaps be
more reluctant to use Chapter 11.
Critics of the mandatory trustee approach would retort that that is
exactly the rub. Not only would the illicit Chapter 11 cases be deterred, but
so too would proper candidates for relief. To borrow an old maxim, it
would be like "throwing the baby out with the bathwater." A mandatory
system thus would "over deter" filings. But, a discretionary system,
experience shows, underdeters.
There are other possible reasons why a mandatory trustee might prove
beneficial. One would be to speed up the reorganization process. As
discussed earlier, one of the probable causes of the lengthy delays in
Chapter 11 is the fact that the debtor retains exclusivity for a virtually
indefinite period, thus allowing the debtor to adopt something of a take-it-orleave-it attitude in plan negotiations. Negotiating gives way to a waiting
game. An independent trustee, however, would not have a vested interest in
delaying the plan to cut a better deal for himself.
Perhaps just as importantly, a disinterested trustee probably could be
more objective about the feasibility of the debtor's chances of successfully
reorganizing. The current high failure rate of Chapter 11 cases suggests
strongly that far too many hopeless debtors give Chapter 11 a whirl. Time
and money are lost before these doomed companies are eventually liquidated
and put out of their misery. An independent trustee would not have the same
predisposition as entrenched management always to try to reorganize the
debtor. Such a person could make an objective assessment that many of
these cases should be liquidated earlier rather than later. The cost savings
derived from earlier termination of these cases very well could offset the
cost outlay involved in hiring a trustee.
Those who worry that Chapter I1 permits unwarranted reallocations
between different categories of claimants also should have reason to favor
a trustee system. The only goal of a trustee should be to maximize the value
of the estate. The trustee again would not have a vested interest to push the
reorganization in a direction that would favor equity or junior creditor
claimants at the expense of senior claimants.
Aside from the cost concern, critics of a mandatory trustee proposal are
sure to object that too many debtors, including some who could be saved in
the friendly confines of Chapter 11, would be deterred from filing.3 79 To

379. This concern was expressed in the 1970s as a reason for abandoning the
mandatory trustee approach. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 2, at 233-34, reprinted
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some extent that may not be altogether bad; the Chapter 11 failure rate
suggests that there are far more hopeless debtors entering Chapter 11 now
than there are salvageable companies who foolishly bypass an attempt at
Chapter 11. In other words, if a choice has to be made between overdeterring and underdeterring Chapter 11 filings, we should adjust the law
now in favor of overdeterring, because the balance now runs so heavily the
other way.
If the deterrence objection is given credence, however, I have a
possible compromise to suggest which may in itself have some beneficent
aspects. That suggestion is to postpone the trustee appointment for some
defined period of time after the Chapter 11 filing. Thus, current management would have a chance to confirm a plan, but if they did not do so
expeditiously, they would be replaced. Giving debtors a chance might lessen
the deterrent effect. For example, the debtor might remain as DIP for 120
days, or six months. If a plan were filed within that time, the debtor then
would have another sixty days to obtain confirmation. Failing either, the
trustee appointment would be automatic. This moratorium, if you want to
call it that, might be drafted so as to dovetail with other "doomsday" events
that I have previously discussed: the expiration of exclusivity, an evaluation
of feasibility of the reorganization, an evaluation of the possibility of a sale,
the restarting of the debtor's obligation to pay interest, and the like. All of
these ideas would be intended (1) to provide the debtor with a real incentive
to move quickly and (2) to formalize the system for assessing the feasibility
of different options and allow for a termination of the case at an early stage.
A slight variation of the foregoing would be to provide for a series of
steadily progressing steps if a plan is not confirmed by dates certain. For
example, after the first 120 days, if no plan is confirmed, an examiner could
be appointed to investigate the debtor's business, the feasibility of an
internal reorganization, and the possibility of a sale. After another 120 days,
the examiner's report would be made. Depending on the contents of that
report and on whether the debtor had by then filed a plan, a trustee might
be appointed at the 240-day mark, and exclusivity terminated. Perhaps
another 120 days later the obligation to pay interest to creditors would
resume.
Several objections might be made to these suggestions. One is that the
whole scheme is too rigid and inflexible. Every case is different and has its
own time demands, critics would charge, and the best results can be
obtained from a flexible, discretionary system. In some cases it simply
would be impossible to comply with the time limits, and those cases would
be unnecessarily lost. One answer to this charge is that the current
discretionary system is not working too well either; the error simply runs

in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6193.
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the other way, with every case being kept alive even though the patient has
long since expired. But, if this inflexibility objection really is taken to be
compelling, then it might be possible to give the court the discretionary
power to override the statutory time triggers. However, and I emphasize
this, there is no point in going this route at all unless the courts' override
power is limited to rare cases; otherwise we will be right back to where we
are now. Thus, an override might be allowed upon a showing of "extremely
compelling circumstances," or the like. Alternatively, the creditors'
committee might be given the power to waive immediate implementation of
a particular remedy, if they believed it would be contrary to the best
interests of the reorganization.
Another criticism might be that some debtors by their very nature are
poor candidates for a trustee, simply because the management of the debtor
really constitutes the critical value of the company. This would be most true
in the case of smaller, closely held debtors. Recall that only Chapter X
provided for a trustee. The Commission bill of 1973 (presumptively)"'
and the Senate bill in 1978 (conclusively)"' would have still have made
a trustee/no trustee distinction based on a combination of factors relating to
the amount of the debtor's debt and the extent to which the debtor is
publicly held. If we are to stay with a single reorganization chapter, the
reality may be that some similar type of distinction would need to be made.
I would favor at least two floor tests: (1) a minimum amount of debt, to
ferret out the truly small "Mom and Pop" outfits where the expense of a
trustee would hardly be warranted, and the likelihood of person-specific
value would be very high; and (2) the existence of a minimum number of
public shareholders.
Of course, if the dual reorganization chapter approach (recall Chapter
10) is taken, that could be the dividing line. The mandatory system could
be implemented in Chapter 11, with the debtor remaining in possession in
Chapter 10. As discussed earlier, that would not be the course I would
favor, at least for now. I think the same advantages could be realized by
different rales in a single chapter.
In sum, then, I think the case can at least be made for taking a hard
look at the mandatory trustee/examiner issue again. As I have suggested,
many of the objections to such a system could be met by phasing in
implementation in various ways and by giving the bankruptcy court a
discretionary override power. The benefits, especially in terms of speeding
cases up and bringing them to a quicker conclusion, could be quite
significant.

380. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 253.
381. See S. REP. No. 989, supranote 370, at 115, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5901.
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VI. CONCLUSION

"Chapter 11" has become an American byword. It is an ingrained part
of not only our legal landscape, but also of our popular culture (and
mythology?). Yet, today, it is fashionable to heap opprobrium on Chapter
11 and to suggest either a radical reworking of Chapter 11 or its outright
repeal.
Against that backdrop, in this Article I have undertaken to assess the
future of Chapter 11. In doing so I have appraised the bases for the
criticisms of Chapter 11, have inquired into the normative justifications for
Chapter 11, and have dissected a multitude of reform proposals. On the
latter score, I first analyzed the more radical proposals for replacing Chapter
11 with a mandatory auction system or with a contract-based contingentequity scheme; both were found wanting in crucial respects. Next, I
examined in some detail the merits of Chapter 10, the proposed smallbusiness chapter. While Chapter 10 has many adherents, my own conclusion
is that Chapter 10 should not be adopted; instead, satisfactory reform could
be accomplished within the confines of Chapter 11. The final part of the
Article looked at a dozen disparate suggestions for revamping Chapter 11
so that it might come closer to achieving its underlying purposes with a
minimum expenditure of time and money. Many of these reform proposals
may have merit. With Congress actively on the bankruptcy reform trail, it
is quite plausible that some of the reforms discussed could become law. If
a Review Commission is formed, many more of the issues are likely to
receive a full airing.
Perhaps the assaults on Chapter 11 have been beneficial, in that they
have forced champions of Chapter 11 to rethink and to defend their
justifications for that chapter. Open and forthright debate hopefully will lead
to a stronger, more effective Chapter 11. I believe that Chapter 11 does
have a future-a very important future-in shaping our nation's legal and
social calculus. Like it or not, Chapter 11 has become the forum in which
many of our most critical and intractable problems are sorted out. For
commercial enterprises, the reorganization court is the court of last resort.
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